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Getting Beyond Religion as Science:




Since ancient times, Western civilization has witnessed a great debate
over a simple but profound question: From whence did we come? Two
major worldviews have dominated that debate: a theistic worldview holding
that we, and the world in which we live, are the purposeful product of a
supernatural creator; and a materialistic worldview holding that we are the
product of unintelligent and random natural forces. This debate rose to the
fore with Darwin's publication of his theory of evolution and the
development of the modern scientific establishment. In America, it initially
took its most conspicuous form in efforts by creationists to ban the teaching
of evolution in American public schools, and then to have creationism taught
as science. After legal setbacks based on the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment, that effort morphed into the intelligent design movement of
the past couple of decades. That movement's aim to gain a place in the
science curriculum recently stalled with a court ruling that it was, like the
creationists before it, attempting to teach religious concepts as science.
Most recently, a notable group of scientists and atheists have reversed the
trend of defending science against religious attacks and launched a very
public and aggressive campaign against religion itself Prominent scientists
and other believers have responded with works attempting to reconcile
science and faith.
* Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. J.D.,
Northwestern University, Chicago, Illinois (1988). I would like to extend my grateful thanks
and appreciation to Kent Greenawalt, Kurt Lash, and Steve Smith for some very helpful
comments on this Article. I would also like to thank Tim Del Castillo for his excellent research
assistance and gratefully acknowledge funding for my work from a research grant provided by
Pepperdine University School of Law.
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This Article proposes a solution to the "religion as science" wars in
American public schools, as well as to the failure of those schools not only to
prepare American youths to understand and participate in this vital debate,
but also to make informed and thoughtful decisions regarding their own
worldviews. Due to confusion about applicable Establishment Clause law or
otherwise, most public schools fail to educate students about the important
role of religion in our society, including religious perspectives on the most
fundamental question regarding our existence-the nature of our origins.
The solution proposed herein is one that some, including presidential
candidates, have suggested, but no one has articulated how and whether it
can be legally done: Teaching a basic philosophy of origins course that is
geared to upper level high school students that teaches and explores various
origins accounts from both scientific and religious perspectives.
This Article suggests the contours of such a course and explains how
one could be offered consistent with First Amendment requirements. By
examining this subject utilizing the time-honored discipline ofphilosophical
analysis, which not only considers the empirical evidence properly
demanded by science but other sources of human knowledge as well,
American youth would be better prepared to take part in this dialogue and to
appreciate the perspectives of others. It is also hoped that such an approach
would relieve much of the pressure placed on the science curriculum by
those religious citizens who view it, and the generally secular agenda of
public education, as promoting a worldview at odds with their most deeply-
held convictions.
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A little philosophy inclineth man's mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy
bringeth men's minds about to religion.
Sir Francis Bacon ("father" of modem science)
In the long run nothing can withstand reason and experience, and the
contradiction religion offers to both is only too palpable.
Sigmund Freud (Twentieth century psychiatrist)
I. Introduction
Are we the product of purposeful creation or impersonal natural forces?
This BIG QUESTION about our existence is easy to ask, but hardly easy to
answer-at least with any degree of consensus. In fact, this simple question is
turning out to be one of the most divisive and intractable in the modem age. To
an increasing degree it has underlain the major legal battles between science
and religion in America' and is rapidly becoming a centerpiece of our current
"1culture wars"-so much, indeed, that U.S. presidential candidates were
1. See, e.g., David Ray Griffin, Process Philosophy and Theology, in THE HISTORY OF
SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN THE WESTERN TRADmON 214,214 (Gary B. Ferngren et al. eds., 2000)
(explaining that the conflict between naturalistic and theistic worldviews lies behind much of
the conflict between science and religionists who read the Bible literally).
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queried about this issue in a major debate of the 2008 race with their responses
receiving more press than their policy positions.2
Charles Darwin effectively (and somewhat reticently) 3 injected this
question into the public consciousness in the latter half of the nineteenth
century, because before he published his evolutionary theory Western
civilization largely assumed that God purposively created our world and its
inhabitants.4 Darwin's theory of natural selection and the evolution of species,
however, suddenly presented what many viewed as an alternative materialistic
explanation for the origins of human life. 5 This view was by no means dictated
by Darwin's theory, however, and many theologians of the late-nineteenth and
early-twentieth centuries argued that the concepts of Darwinian evolution and
2. See, e.g., Kathleen Parker, Evolution, Creation Dicey Debate Topics, BALT. SUN, May
14, 2007, at 9A (discussing how the "[d]o you believe in evolution?" debate question put to
Republican presidential candidates "remains controversial among some people of faith-
including some respected scientists-for whom evolutionary theory reduces man's world to a
godless accident bereft of moral meaning or structure"); see also Patricia Cohen, A Split
Emerges as Conservatives Discuss Darwin, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2007, at Al (discussing the
presidential debate and observing that "[flor some conservatives, accepting Darwin undercuts
religious faith and produces an amoral materialistic worldview that easily embraces abortion,
embryonic stem cell research and other practices they abhor," while explaining how other
conservatives have begun relying on Darwin's theories to support many conservative causes).
Other recent examples of this culture war abound. A notable one is reflected in the recent movie
Expelled: No Intelligence Allowed, which attempts to paint a portrait of a scientist-atheist
conspiracy to thwart the teaching of ideas from the Intelligent Design movement in public
schools. EXPELLED: No INTELLIGENCE ALLOWED (Rocky Mountain Pictures 2008). On the
other side of the divide, for recent movies attacking religious worldviews, see RELIGULOUS
(Lionsgate 2008) and THE GOD WHO WASN'T THERE (Beyond Belief Media 2005).
3. See Mary Jo Murphy, Wordfor Word; My Dear Fellow Species, N.Y. TIMES, May 20,
2007, at D5 (reporting about a new online collection of Darwin's letters, and discussing one in
which Darwin describes relating his conclusion that species were not immutable as "like
confessing a murder").
4. See, e.g., WARREN A. NORD, RELIGION & AMERICAN EDUCATION: RETHINKING A
NATIONAL DILEMMA 287 (1995) (noting that "a large part of what was revolutionary about the
scientific revolution was its rejection of the idea that nature, like history, could be understood
only in terms of God's purposes"). That is not to say that materialist philosophies did not exist
prior to Darwin; they certainly did. See Peter J. Bowler, Evolution, in THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE
AND RELIGION IN THE WESTERN TRADITION, supra note 1, at 458, 459 (noting that before
Darwin's time "materialist thinkers... had begun to suggest that life could be created on the
earth by natural processes (spontaneous generation) and that the species thus produced might
change in response to natural forces"). However Darwin's Origin of Species marked a
widespread turning point from theism to naturalism as far as scientific explanations about nature
were concerned. See John Henry, Atheism, in THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN THE
WESTERN TRADITION, supra note 1, at 182, 187 ("Darwinism perhaps marks the final removal of
God and religion from the scientific enterprise.").
5. See Bowler supra note 4, at 458-59 (noting that "Darwin proposed new lines of
evidence to show how evolutionism could explain natural relationships, but he also suggested a
new and potentially more materialistic mechanism of evolution").
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theistic creation were compatible with each other-in short, that God created
humankind using some form of evolutionary mechanism.
6
Such attempts at reconciling these two concepts were cold comfort to
those religious groups that took the Bible at its literal word, however, and such
"creationists" mobilized political and legal forces to stem the spread of
evolutionary theory-at least in terms of it being taught in public school
science classes.7 When laws were passed prohibiting the teaching of evolution
in science courses, the courts eventually invalidated them as being religiously
motivated in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.8
One major response was to enact laws mandating the teaching of "scientific
evidence" for Biblical creation (i.e., "creation science") in conjunction with any
teaching of evolutionary theory. Courts also invalidated such laws on
Establishment Clause grounds, in significant part because they determined,
implicitly or explicitly, that creation science was not legitimate science.9
The "creationism wars" in no sense ended concerns about the potential
materialistic or atheistic implications of Darwinian theory (modernly referred to
as "neo-Darwinian theory" based on its supplementation with more recent
scientific findings). 10 Indeed, in the 1990s, a group of scholarly religionists
driven more by concerns about those implications than literal conflicts with
sacred text, including a perceived infiltration of secularist and materialistic
attitudes into the American consciousness, initiated a more sophisticated attack
on evolutionary theory. Having learned from the "creation wars," this group
has attempted to put forth critiques of that theory based on what they claim is
6. See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text (noting that by 1870 most educated
people and scientists accepted the concept of evolution but still believed God was behind the
process).
7. See Ronald L. Numbers, Creationism Since 1859, in THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND
RELIGION IN THE WESTERN TRADmON, supra note 1, at 313, 314-16 (describing creationists'
efforts to erase Darwinism from public school textbooks).
8. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 98-99, 109 (1968) (holding
unconstitutional an Arkansas law which made it unlawful for a teacher in a public school or
university to teach or use a textbook that teaches "the theory or doctrine that mankind ascended
or descended from a lower order of animals"). It took some time for antievolution laws to be
invalidated. They were initially passed in the 1920s and served as the basis for the famous
Scopes monkey trial. Infra note 86 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 591-92 (1987) (invalidating creation
science law as being religiously motivated and implying that creation science was not legitimate
science in determining that it embodied a religious belief in a supernatural creator); McLean v.
Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1272 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (invalidating creation science law
as having the purpose and effect of advancing religion, and explicitly determining that creation
science was not legitimate science).
10. See infra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing the "neo-Darwinian synthesis" of
the 1930s and 1940s).
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legitimate scientific evidence and analysis-essentially purporting to present
scientific proof that neo-Darwinian theory cannot explain the emergence of
more complex life forms on Earth. At its core, the so-called "Intelligent
Design" (ID) movement claims that the central tenet of neo-Darwinian theory-
the gradual evolution of life forms based on random mutations that nature
"selects" for continued existence according to their survival value (otherwise
known as the theory of natural selection)-is fatally flawed either because such
a process cannot logically produce the complex life forms that it claims to, or
because the mathematical probability that such life forms can arise through
random events is virtually nil. Hence, ID proponents conclude, complex life
forms must be the product of conscious and intelligent design.1 The unstated
implication of ID theory-"unstated" presumably because of concerns about
scientific legitimacy in general, and the constitutionality of teaching such a
concept in particular-is that such life forms must have been created by an
intelligent, supernatural being rather than random natural processes.1
2
The ID movement has enjoyed some traction, with its most notable
accomplishment being its inclusion in a policy adopted by the school board of
Dover, Pennsylvania requiring its high school science teachers to notify their
students about ID theory as an alternative to evolutionary theory.13 I say "most
notable" because Dover's policy drew the first court decision to assess the
constitutionality of promoting ID in the science classroom. A federal district
court in Dover held that the board's policy violated the Establishment Clause,
in large part because ID theory did not constitute legitimate science.
14
According to the court, "ID is not science and cannot be adjudged a valid,
accepted scientific theory as it has failed to publish in peer-reviewed journals,
engage in research and testing, and gain acceptance in the scientific
community. ID... is grounded in theology, not science... [and] has utterly
no place in a science curriculum."'
15
Not only, then, has the ID movement lost its first major battle to be
considered science, but it also constitutes one of several developments that has
been responsible for initiating a third major phase of the theism-materialism
11. See infra notes 117-30 and accompanying text.
12. See FRANCES S. COLLINS, THE LANGUAGE OF GOD: A SCIENTIST PRESENTS EVIDENCE
FOR BELIEF 186 (2006) (asserting that the "ID movement is careful not to specify who this
designer might have been, but the Christian perspective of most of the leaders of this movement
implicitly suggests that this missing force would come from God himself').
13. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 708-09 (M.D. Pa.
2005) (describing a resolution and a press release announcing new policy).
14. Id. at 765.
15. Id. at 745.
GETTING BEYOND RELIGION AS SCIENCE
contest in America. Up until very recently, the scientific community has
generally contented itself with fending off the attempts of creationists and ID
proponents to, as it saw it, undermine the teaching of evolutionary science in
public education. In the last couple of years, however, many possessing
science-centered worldviews have gone on the offensive against religion in a
surprisingly aggressive way. Bolstered by advances in evolutionary biology,
human genetics, and studies of human cognition, and angered by everything
from the "alleged influence of the Christian right on Bush Administration
science policy to the fanatic faith of the 9/11 terrorists to intelligent design's
ongoing claims," 16 scientists that believe our existence is wholly explainable in
materialistic terms have flooded the market with books "describing a caged
death match between science and God-with science winning, or at least
chipping away at faith's underlying verities.' 7 In addition to writing one of
those books which he called The God Delusion,18 Richard Dawkins, a former
biology professor at Oxford University and one of the leading spokespersons of
the dominant atheist segment of the scientific community, spoke at a
conference on the religion-science divide and described religious education as
"brainwashing" and "child abuse."'19 Such books and conferences have
prompted leading scientists who do believe in a creator to "come out of the
closet" and present their case. Most notably, Francis Collins, the former head
of the U.S. Government's touted Human Genome Project, recently published
The Language of God: A Scientist Presents Evidence for Belief.20
16. David Van Biema, God vs. Science, TIME, Nov. 13, 2006, at 48.
17. Id.; see also id. at 52 (discussing the new book of atheist and science commentator
Richard Dawkins, and noting that he was "riding the crest of an atheist literary wave").
However, the current materialism versus theism debate is not limited to scientists. In addition to
Dawkins and neuroscience doctoral candidate Sam Harris, the so-called "four horsemen" of the
new atheism also includes Daniel Dennett, a professor of philosophy, and Christopher Hitchens,
a journalist. All four of these individuals have each published recent books on atheism's
claimed intellectual superiority to theism. See generally RICHARD DAWKINS, THE GOD DELUSION
(2006); DANIEL DENNETT, BREAKING THE SPELL: RELIGION AS A NATURAL PHENOMENON (2006);
SAM HARRIS, THE END OF FAITH: RELIGION, TERROR, AND THE FUTURE OF REASON (2004);
CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, GOD IS NOT GREAT: How RELIGION POISONS EVERYTHING (2007). See
also generally JOHN ALLEN PAULOS, IRRELIGION: A MATHEMATICIAN EXPLAINS WHY THE
ARGUMENTS FOR GOD JUST DON'T ADD UP 148-49 (2008).
18. DAWKINS, supra note 17; see infra notes 292-97 and accompanying text (discussing
further Dawkins's claims).
19. See George Johnson, A Free-for-All on Science and Religion, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21,
2006, at Fl (reporting on a conference of prominent scientists where religion was heavily
criticized).
20. FRANCIS S. COLLINS, THE LANGUAGE OF GOD: A SCIENTIST PRESENTS EVIDENCE FOR
BELIEF 3 (2006); see infra notes 298-307 and accompanying text for a further discussion of
Collins's claims; see also DARREL R. FALK, COMING TO PEACE WITH SCIENCE: BRIDGING
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It is not surprising that the question of the basic character of our origins
and existence has engendered protracted legal contests and now a virulent
cultural debate. Plainly, a person's beliefs regarding this fundamental question
can go a long way towards shaping her basic decisions, attitudes, and values in
life, affecting not only her view of her place in the universe and her relationship
to others, but also the very meaning of her existence.2' In other words, it
normally matters to a person's basic outlook on life whether she believes that
human existence is the product of impersonal natural forces or the handiwork
of a caring, divine being. In short, such beliefs can have a profound effect on
the shaping of an individual's worldview.22
Thus, it is troubling that American public education does little to nothing
to prepare students-and particularly older high school students that are
starting to seriously think about these issues, including those who may never go
on to a college education where courses might first begin to cover some of
THE WORLDS BETWEEN FAITH AND BIOLOGY (2008); JOAN ROUGHGARDEN, EVOLUTION AND
CHRISTIAN FAITH: REFLECTIONS OF AN EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGIST (2006); accord KENNETH R.
MILLER, FINDING DARWIN'S GOD: A SCIENTIST'S SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND BETWEEN GOD
AND EVOLUTION (1999).
21. As Harvard psychiatry professor Armand Nicholi eloquently puts it:
Whether we realize it or not, all of us possess a worldview. A few years after birth,
we all gradually formulate our philosophy of life. Most of us make one of two
basic assumptions: we view the universe as a result of random events and life on
this planet a matter of chance; or we assume an Intelligence beyond the universe
who gives the universe order, and life meaning. Our worldview informs our
personal, social, and political lives. It influences how we perceive ourselves, how
we relate to others, how we adjust to adversity, and what we understand to be our
purpose. Our worldview helps determine our values, our ethics, and our capacity
for happiness. It helps us understand where we come from, our heritage; who we
are, our identity; why we exist on this planet, our purpose; what drives us, our
motivation; and where we are going, our destiny .... Our worldview tells more
about us perhaps than any other aspect of our personal history.
ARMAND M. NICHOLI, JR., THE QUESTION OF GOD: C.S. LEWIS AND SIGMUND FREUD DEBATE
GOD, LOVE, SEX, AND THE MEANING OF LIFE 7 (2002); see also COLLINS, supra note 20, at 6
(discussing scientific versus spiritual worldviews and observing that "[wlhether we call it by
name or not, all of us have arrived at a certain worldview. It helps us make sense of the world
around us, provides us with an ethical framework, and guides our decisions about the future").
22. See NICHOLI, JR., supra note 21, at 7 (discussing the two basic assumptions that help
to formulate our philosophy of life and noting the implications our worldview has on our lives);
see also id. at 9 (observing that "if the spiritual [versus materialistic] worldview is true, then all
other truth fades in significance. Nothing has more profound and more far-reaching
implications for our lives"); Frederick Gregory, Materialism, in THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND
RELIGION IN THE WESTERN TRADITION, supra note 1, at 176, 176 ("From the time of the ancient
Greeks,... the human need for a foundational belief upon which to base a worldview has
swayed back and forth between the poles of matter and spirit. Depending upon which pole one
chooses,.., the worlds that result turn out to be very different places.").
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them2 3-to understand and appreciate basic scientific and religious perspectives
on this matter, and ultimately to assist them in forming their own worldviews.
24
Religion is essentially ignored by public schools (including religious
perspectives on the nature of reality),25 while science frequently presents a very
sterile account of evolutionary theory without placing it in proper context-i.e.,
without educating students on the inherent limits of the scientific endeavor (its
methodological commitment to explaining how the natural world works solely
in terms of its observed laws and properties), or explaining the fact that science,
by its own ground rules, is not designed to answer questions about why such
natural processes or laws might exist in the first place and how they may have
originated.26 And even if evolutionary theory was presented to students with
the proper analytical caveats, the absence of any attempts by schools to draw
out the broader implications of that theory for comprehensive perspectives on
meanings of life, and to balance those against religious views on the subject,
seems to favor scientific or materialistic accounts of existence by default or
implication.27
While one could argue that religious perspectives on life receive their due
at home or in worship communities, there are at least two major problems with
this. First, as Kent Greenawalt has written, teaching science but ignoring
religion as part of a public education tends to disparage the latter mode of
viewing the world because the imprimatur of being considered sufficiently
important to be included in that education is denied to it.28 Second, religion in
23. Cf, e.g., NORD, supra note 4, at 213 (noting that "religion is central to liberal
education" and that "a majority of students will not go on to receive a liberal education in
universities, either because they will pursue no higher education at all or because they will
receive a narrowly technical or professional education").
24. See, e.g., Jay D. Wexler, Darwin, Design and Disestablishment: Teaching the
Evolution Controversy in Public Schools, 56 VAND. L. REV. 751, 760 (2003) ("If schools are
going to train citizens to be capable of participating effectively and knowledgeably in American
democracy, they must do a better job of teaching students about religious ideas, and religious
views on the origins of universe and mankind are among the most important of these
ideas .... ).
25. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, DOES GOD BELONG IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS? 81 (2005)
(stating that "[m]ost public schools now largely ignore religion"); NORD, supra note 4, at 1 ("It
is a striking fact that in American public schools.., students can-and most do--earn high
school diplomas.., without ever confronting a live religious idea. We take it for granted that
students can know everything they need to know about whatever they study without knowing
anything about religion.").
26. Infra notes 192-201 and accompanying text.
27. Infra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
28. See GREENAWALT, supra note 25, at 83-84 (discussing the common complaint that
"by treating all subjects from a secular point of view and by presenting secular modes of
knowledge as sufficient for life, instruction within schools implies that religious understanding
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worship communities tends to be primarily sectarian, focusing largely on
religious doctrine and practice.29 Such religious training would likely lack the
broader philosophical and theoretical approaches and viewpoints needed to
fully come to grips with the materialism-theism debate.3°
So what is the solution to preparing our younger generations to consider
and make up their owns minds about such important questions of life,
particularly if religious approaches to questions of our origins and existence
cannot be considered in the science classroom because of the way science
defines its own endeavor? I will argue that the solution is what presidential
candidates, other politicians, and even some scientists are starting to intuit-
that instead of seeking to include asserted evidence and arguments in favor of
"nature-plus" causes or explanations for life in the science classroom, they,
together with analogous cases for a more materialistic account, ought to be
taught in a basic philosophy course designed for this subject and geared to
upper class high school students (call it "Perspectives on the Nature of Life" or
something along these lines).3' In contrast to science, philosophy investigates
is not at the center of human understanding, but rather at its periphery," and observing this
critique was "substantially accurate").
29. Cf., e.g., Ferenc M. Szasz, Modern American Mainline Protestantism, in THE HISTORY
OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN THE WESTERN TRADITION, supra note 1, at 291,294 ("Similarly, the
changes in the scientific community-such as the discovery of DNA... ; the acceptance of
plate tectonics or continental drift... ; and the discovery of quarks and other subnuclear
particles... -evoked little interest in the churches.").
30. By labeling this as a "materialism-theism" debate, I in no way mean to suggest that
these are the only two legitimate paradigms of reality. Many religions do not recognize the
concept of a personal God, one of the hallmarks of a theistic religion such as Judaism,
Christianity, or Islam. However, since the American legal and cultural contests between
science and religion have tended to involve Christian groups, this Article will oversimplify
matters and focus primarily on the materialism-theism debate. Cf Gary B. Ferngren, Preface, in
THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN THE WESTERN TRADITION, supra note 1, at xiii, xiv
(explaining that "underlying the diversity of the several streams that have fed Western
civilization, there exists a basic substratum, formed by the West's dual heritage of the classical
world of Greece and Rome and the monotheistic traditions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam").
However, I will also discuss how origins perspectives from other religious traditions could be
taught in the sort of high school course I will advocate herein. Infra notes 367-68 and
accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Sam Brownback, Op-Ed, What I ThinkAbout Evolution, N.Y. TMES, May31,
2007, at A19 (discussing debate question on evolution and then-presidential candidate stating that
"[m] any questions raised by evolutionary theory-like whether man has a unique place in the world
or is merely the chance product of random mutations--go beyond empirical science and are better
addressed in the realm of philosophy or theology"); Michael Luo, Romney Elaborates on
Evolution, The Caucus Blog, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/05/1 1/romney-elaborates-
on-evolution/ (May 11, 2007, 10:19 EST) (last visited Nov. 6, 2008) (then-presidential candidate
observing that "[iln my opinion, the science class is where to teach evolution .... If we're going
to talk about more philosophical matters, like why it was created, and was there an
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"the nature, causes, or principles of reality, knowledge, or values, based on
logical reasoning rather than empirical methods. 3 2  In other words,
consideration of the nature of reality in a philosophy course would not be
confined to inferences drawn from empirical evidence in the physical world,
but would also consider arguments from other sources of human understanding
including religious experience, intuition, and insights.33 Such a course would
ideally give students a variety of raw materials for assisting them to answer one
basic question for themselves: Considering different sources of human
knowledge and understanding, what account of existence seems to make the
most sense?
If politicians can see this as a solution to the "religion as science" battles in
public education, one might plausibly ask why school districts have not already
implemented such a proposal-or something akin to it-as an alternative to
fighting costly and protracted legal contests over what evidence and
argumentation does or does not count as legitimate science. One reason may be
the "epistemic superiority" many perceive science as possessing over other
ways of knowing and understanding the world because it is methodologically
committed to a rigorous analysis of evidence accessible to our physical senses.34
In other words, the argument would go, students and others accept science as
the most accurate account of life because it is based on types of information
that are the most obvious and tangible to us, and thus evidence and
argumentation for "nature-plus" causation will be taken seriously only when
garbed in such clothing. There may be something to this, but the long history
and tenaciousness of the "religion as science" disputes seem to indicate a more
intelligent designer behind it, that's for the religion class or philosophy class or social studies
class") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Governor Says Intelligent Design
Doesn 't Belong in Science Classes, Assoc. PRESS, Aug. 29, 2005 (describing governor of
Utah's idea that intelligent design should not be taught in science classes but rather should be
taught "[i]f it comes up in sociology or philosophy as differing views on creation"); see also
Alan I. Leshner, Editorial, Redefining Science, SCIENCE, July 8, 2005, at 221 ("[lIt is
appropriate to teach about belief-based concepts like ID in humanities courses, in classes
comparing religious points of view, or in philosophy courses that contrast religious and
scientific approaches to the world. However, what is taught in science class should be limited to
science. Redefining science to get a particular belief into the classroom simply isn't
educationally sound.").
32. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1319 (4th ed.
2000). For a more extended discussion of the nature of philosophy, see infra notes 276-83 and
accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 1, at 214, 215 (discussing views of philosopher Alfred
North Whitehead that "[p]hilosophy must, in particular, draw upon nonsensory intuitions as
well as sensory experience, thereby allowing religious experience to make its own contribution
to metaphysics").
34. See generally infra Part III.A.
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systemic or "structural" cause for the lack of any sort of formal philosophical
consideration of materialistic versus theistic accounts of life in public
education. If leading candidates for such a cause were to be identified, one
would likely be the U.S. Supreme Court's tangled Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, which has marked science as a legitimate subject of public
education but has thrown up caution signals and red flags around any teaching
involving religion.35
The Court has repeatedly held that public schools may not teach religion
as truth, even though in dicta it has stated that they may constitutionally teach
and educate students about religion.36 At the same time, however, the Court
has decreed in various decisions that the government may not take any actions
that have the purpose, appearance, or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting
sectarian religious beliefs or religious belief in general.37 In other words,
government neutrality towards religion and nonreligion seems to be the
touchstone of these principles. But if schools teach students about religion, and
particularly about religious perspectives on subjects, aren't they inevitably
going to advance or inhibit religious beliefs based on a student's agreement or
disagreement with those perspectives? And is the government in such cases
acting neutrally towards religion, in either purpose, appearance, or effect?
The answers to these questions are certainly not self evident, and it is easy
to see why public school boards across the country essentially take a "hands
off' approach to teaching religion and have implemented largely secular
curriculums. 38 These questions would likely be even more troubling to a school
board official who otherwise might seriously consider implementing a basic
philosophy of origins course along the lines suggested above as a potential
solution to the "religion as science" problem. Unlike a history or comparative
35. See, e.g., CHARLEs C. HAYNES & OLIvER THOMAs, FINDING COMMON GROuND: A
GUIDE TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN PUBLIC SCHOOLs 5 (2001) (asserting that the influence of the
mistaken view of the Establishment Clause that religion must be excluded from the public
schools "is apparent in the virtual silence about religion in most of the curriculum"). As Kent
Greenawalt helpfully pointed out to me, the absence of any such course may simply result from
the fact that public high schools do not typically offer any philosophy classes in their curricula.
This may well be, but it seems highly plausible that even if such schools might be inclined to
break from typical practice and offer one of the nature proposed in this Article, Establishment
Clause concerns might very well stifle such an initiative in its inception. See infra notes 38-40
and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963)
("Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion, when
presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be effected consistently
with the First Amendment."); see also infra notes 329-30 and accompanying text.
37. Infra notes 322-33 and accompanying text.
38. Supra notes 25, 35.
GETTING BEYOND RELIGION AS SCIENCE
religion course that aims mainly at communicating factual materials regarding a
religion's role in history or its tenets and practices, the nature of a philosophy
course is essentially to dissect and evaluate the rationality of differing claims to
truth from the perspective of reason, human experience, and empirical
evidence. 39 And while rational, critical evaluation does not necessarily entail
the making of ultimate judgments about the relative soundness of such claims,
it certainly moves closer to the line of "truth-teaching" than does the mere
descriptive or explanatory teaching of religion. In sum, it is easy to see how
difficulties in understanding and applying the Court's Establishment Clause
doctrine might chill education officials from adding basic comparative and
historical religion courses to public school curricula, much less a course
designed to explore philosophically the claims of science and religion about
40fundamental questions of human existence.
This Article, then, will analyze whether a basic philosophy of origins
course designed to resolve the "religion as science" controversy in public
schools can indeed be taught consistently with existing Establishment Clause
doctrine. It will not only fill a conspicuous gap in the scholarly literature as to
the feasibility and legality of such a course, but also with regard to how critical
evaluations of claims to truth from religious perspectives fit into the Court's
overly simplistic "teaching about" versus "teaching of' religion paradigm.'
39. See generally infra Part III.C.
40. However, in 2005 a California public school district adopted plans to teach a high
school course on origins, purportedly from a philosophical approach, but abandoned them after
parents and the ACLU threatened to sue on the grounds that the particular course at issue had
been specifically designed to promote religion-i.e., intelligent design. See Laurie Goodstein,
California Parents File Suit Over Origins of Life Course, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2006, at Al 8
(discussing how the proposed course entitled "Philosophy of Design" was, in reality, a thinly-
veiled guise to teach intelligent design). This incident was unfortunate, since, as I will argue,
the school district unwittingly had the right solution to teaching different origins perspectives-
using a philosophical rather than scientific approach-but attempted to implement it in a
decidedly non-philosophical way (i.e., as a ruse to advocate religion rather than to promote, in
good faith, an understanding of various origins perspectives). It is my hope that this event will
not deter or taint honest efforts by other school districts to offer a genuine philosophy of origins
course to educate students on issues so fundamental to their lives, and as a potential solution to
the "religion as science" conflicts discussed in this Article. In this spirit, I will propose certain
measures that school districts planning to offer such a course could adopt to prevent the sort of
misuse of it as occurred in this case. See infra Part IV.C.
41. This is not to say that other scholars have not made proposals for reforming the public
school curriculum to address some of these issues, but they have focused mainly on teaching
comparative sectarian versions of origins in a social or religious studies course for the purpose
of addressing the creationism and ID versus evolution controversies. See, e.g., NORD, supra
note 4, at 289-92; WEXLER, supra note 24, at 776-99; see also GREENAWALT, supra note 25, at
90-91 (arguing that students should be apprised of gaps in evolutionary theory, which might
include a discussion of ID as one conceivable alternative, but concluding that "[s]erious
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Part II will present a more detailed overview of the historic materialism-theism
debate within Western civilization-demonstrating that it is one that has been
ongoing since ancient times-as well as the "religion as science" battles in
American schools and the more recent escalation of the culture war related to
this issue.42 Part III will examine the reasons why modem creationists and ID
proponents continue pushing for their views and theories to be considered in
public school science classes, and their prospects for succeeding on that
strategy--especially in the wake of Kitzmiller.43 It will conclude that these
prospects are dim even though such groups will likely never give up this fight
unless an acceptable alternative becomes available. It will then discuss why a
basic philosophy of origins course would be the best choice for such an
alternative and begin to trace the outlines of what the subject matter of such a
course might look like. More specifically, it will contend that addressing any
"ism's" that might be implied by an exclusively scientific account of our origins
to a philosophy of origins course would be the best solution because such belief
systems are more appropriately examined as philosophy than science.
Lastly, Part IV will examine whether such a course can be offered that is
consistent with modem Establishment Clause doctrine. 44 It will conclude that,
despite the vagaries of that doctrine it can, as long as appropriate measures are
taken to ensure that textbooks and teachers of such a course avoid making any
judgments about the ultimate truth of competing counts, sticking instead to
assisting students to develop their own worldviews by presenting a variety of
perspectives and helping them to evaluate critically their basis in reason,
evidence, and experience. It will also argue that to the extent Establishment
Clause doctrine is read otherwise, it would present substantial tensions with the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment that should be avoided. Finally,
Part IV will outline various steps in the planning and implementation of an
origins course that school districts could take to provide assurance that its
development of competing [origins] perspectives should be reserved for courses in history,
culture or comparative religion, or courses self-consciously adopting an interdisciplinary
approach, such as 'Perspectives on the Environment"'). This Article takes a different approach.
Not only does it argue that students ought to be taught broader origins perspectives than
sectarian religious versions to prepare them for the ongoing materialism-theism debate
(although such social or religious studies courses could and should be offered in addition to the
course proposed herein), but that different religious and scientific perspectives ought to be
taught and compared using philosophical analysis both to deepen students' understanding of
these issues and to ideally take some pressure off of the creation-evolution controversies to the
extent they are being driven by perceived conflicts involving specific sectarian versions of
origins.
42. See generally infra Part II.
43. See generally infra Part III.
44. See generally infra Part IV.
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subject matter and teaching remained well within constitutional bounds. It is
this author's hope that such a course would not only go far towards preparing
our young generation to develop individually and participate in public
discourse with respect to these fundamental questions, but also to defuse the
"religion as science" controversies that are sure to continue roiling our Nation
in the absence of such a solution.
11. The Western Materialism-Theism Divide and Its Manifestations in
American Public Education and Popular Culture
A. Greco-European Antecedents
Since the dawning of Western civilization, its peoples have generally
recognized a god or gods associated with the creation of the universe and
humankind. A belief in such deities allowed people to make better sense of
their world and existence-where they came from and what their place was in
the order of things.45 The ancient Greeks had a polytheist tradition and
recognized multiple gods that were part of the natural world, shared many
attributes of humans, and interacted with them in various ways.46 Ancient
Hebrew tribes from more eastern lands, by contrast, had developed a
monotheistic tradition that worshipped one God who transcended the natural
world 47-- that is, existed in a supernatural state on a separate plane of reality
frequently referred to as a spiritual plane of existence.48 Like the Greek gods,
the Hebrew God remained present in the natural world; unlike those gods,
however, His interactions with humans were more subtle, consisting primarily
45. See, e.g., Frederick Suppe, Epistemology, in THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION
IN THE WESTERN TRADITION, supra note 1, at 24, 24 ("Both religion and science attempt to bring
order, understanding, and even control to the cosmos that human beings inhabit.").
46. See Jan N. Bremmer, Greek Religion [Further Considerations], in 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF RELIGION 3677, 3677-81 (Lindsay Jones ed., 2d ed. 2005) (discussing various ancient Greek
Gods, their human attributes, and their interactions with humans and each other); JAN N.
BREMMER, GREEK RELIGION 5 (Oxford Univ. Press 1994) ("Whereas the Christian world-view
increasingly separates God from this world, the gods of the Greeks were not transcendent but
directly involved in natural and social processes.").
47. See S. David Sperling, God: God in the Hebrew Scriptures, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
RELIGION, supra note 46, at 3537, 3539 (describing the development of Hebraic monotheism).
48. See Theodore M. Ludwig, Monotheism, in 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION, supra note
46, at 6155, 6158-59 (explaining that monotheism posits "a definite separation between the one
divine reality and the world that God brought into existence. In this sense, there is a dualistic
emphasis in monotheism, for there are two distinct realms of reality, the divine and the created
world").
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of intermittent revelations and interventions combined with an abiding
spiritual presence in world and the depths of human consciousness.49
The Romans had a polytheistic tradition that over time assimilated
much of the Greek mythologies, but after the Emperor Constantine
legalized Christianity in the Roman Empire in 313,50 the Hebraic
monotheistic tradition started on a path toward dominance in Western
civilization. After the fall of that empire, this tradition was largely carried
forward through the Middle Ages by the Roman Catholic Church, and even
after the sixteenth-century Reformation splintered Christianity the tradition
of a monotheistic "transcendent but immanent" God remained dominant in
the West and continues so today among its religious believers (including
not only Christians, of course, but the West's Jewish and Muslim believers
as well). 5'
Belief in such a Deity or deities, however, has almost always been
conditioned by humankind's sentient and rational faculties-its ability to
empirically observe the world and engage in logical reasoning about it.
Throughout history, humankind has relied on such faculties to either
support or criticize religious beliefs depending on one's worldview
regarding such matters. Thus, for example, classical Greek philosophers such as
Democritus and Epicurus developed a system of thought called atomism which
attempted to explain "all physical phenomena in terms of the behavior and
interaction of vanishingly small indivisible particles. 52 Although not explicitly a
denial of ancient Greek religion-Epicurus himself, for example, took the
position that the gods existed but did not concern themselves with the natural
world53 -the atheistic overtones of atomism contributed to the effort of
49. See Sperling, supra note 47, at 3542 ("Though God was generally not visible, he might
manifest himself publicly in the kavod .... [T]he kavod of Yahveh is of intense luminosity and is
often shielded by a cloud. The kavodis sometimes spoken of as filling the entire earth.") (citations
omitted); Ludwig, supra note 48, at 6159 ("[M]ost forms of monotheism hold God not only as
transcendent but also as immanent in the world: God's presence, power, and operation are
immediately present in human experience.... Revelation from God is important as guidance ....
And God works in the history of the world, directing events toward an eschaton in which there will
be evaluation and judgment.").
50. See Nathan D. Mitchell, Religious Communities: Christian Religious Orders, in 11
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION, supra note 46, at 7721, 7723 (discussing "the emperor Constantine's
Edict of Milan (313), which recognized Christianity as a licit religion in the empire").
51. See generally, e.g., HANs KUNG & JOHN BOWDEN, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH: A SHORT
HISTORY (2001).
52. Henry, supra note 4, at 122.
53. See Gregory, supra note 22, at 177 ("For Epicurus and Lucretius, who believed in the
existence of the gods, the lack of involvement was due to the gods' complete lack of interest in
natural or human affairs.").
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Socrates and his student Plato to argue for the additional existence of non-
material planes of reality such as the soul or the ideal world of the "Forms.
' 54
While rationalist thought about the nature of reality, and particularly
atomist philosophy, laid fairly quiescent during the dominance of Christian
orthodoxy throughout the Middle Ages, it reemerged in the middle of the
second millennium and developed into a "mechanical philosophy" propounded
by several seventeenth-century philosophers.55 That system of philosophy
again sought to explain all natural phenomena in terms of small particles of
matter and their motions, and was the basis for Isaac Newton's revolutionary
discoveries regarding the laws of physical motion.56 While Newton and other
leading proponents of mechanical philosophy were committed Christians who
viewed and promoted such a law-bound system as the way in which God
designed and planned the operation of the natural world, they also feared its
potential materialistic and atheistic implications. 57 Such fears were realized in
the eighteenth century Enlightenment, when anticlerical sentiments ran high
and several prominent philosophers relied on mechanical philosophy to
promote an atheistic and materialistic view of reality.58 Nonetheless, in the
54. See Edward B. Davis & Robin Collins, Scientific Naturalism, in THE HISTORY OF
SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN THE WESTERN TRADITION, supra note 1, at 201 ("Although Plato...
shared the atomists' opposition to Greek polytheism, he rejected their purely natural
nonteleological mode of explanation."); Stanley L. Jaki, God, Nature, and Science, in THE
HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN THE WESTERN TRADITION, supra note 1, at 45 ("It was in
reaction to th[e] dehumanizing trend [of materialism and atomism] that Socrates... proposed
the animation of all matter so that a defense of the existence of an immortal human soul (anima)
could be argued."); Richard Kraut, Plato, in THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 709,
710 (Robert Audi ed., 2d ed. 1999) (describing the existence of abstract objects known as forms
that are "eternal, changeless, and incorporeal; since they are imperceptible, we can come to have
knowledge of them only through thought").
55. See Margaret J. Osler, Mechanical Philosophy, in THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND
RELIGION IN THE WESTERN TRADITION, supra note 1, at 149, 149-50 ("Because of its reputation
as atheistic and materialistic, Epicureanism [i.e., atomism] fell into disrepute during the Middle
Ages."); id. at 150-51 (discussing adoption of mechanical philosophies by philosophers Pierre
Gassendi and Rene Descartes based on ideas derived from atomism).
56. See id. at 149 ("Mechanical philosophy was a philosophy of nature, popular in the
seventeenth century, that sought to explain all natural phenomena in terms of matter and motion
without recourse to any kind of action-at-a-distance."); id. at 151-53 (discussing Newton's
acceptance of mechanical philosophy and his subsequent discoveries that were driven by it).
57. See, e.g., id. at 151 ("Another mechanical philosopher, Thomas Hobbes,... was the
specter haunting more orthodox mechanical philosophers. Whatever the state of his religious
beliefs, Hobbes's philosophy seemed-to the seventeenth century reader-to be materialistic,
deterministic, and possibly even atheistic.").
58. See id. at 153. Osler states:
In the decades after Newton's death, the worst fears of the Christian mechanical
philosophers of the seventeenth century came true.... Some of the French
philosophes. . . espoused atheistic materialism and adopted vigorously anticlerical
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same period many Christian philosophers continued to defend mechanical
philosophy as evidencing God's purposeful design of the natural world. 59
Regardless of whether one viewed mechanical philosophy as supporting or
undermining religious claims, when the profession of science began to emerge
in the nineteenth century, that philosophy laid the foundation for the adoption
of a naturalistic or materialistic commitment in the performance of science; that
is, a commitment to explaining phenomena solely in terms of natural
mechanisms and causes (otherwise known as "methodological naturalism").
60
Not only was that commitment a by-product of the new profession's desire to
distinguish itself from the established clergy that had produced many of the
earlier natural philosophers, but it was also part of a wider trend of cultural
secularization in which European society was continuing to free itself from the
authoritarian influence of institutionalized Christianity.6' But something else
happened in the nineteenth century that turned a trend towards scientific
methodological naturalism into a trend towards scientific ontological
naturalism or the adoption of a wholly materialistic worldview-the publication
by Darwin in 1859 of his Origin of Species.62
Evolutionary theory was not new with Darwin. The idea of random
changes producing anatomical changes in animals had its seeds in the atomist
philosophy of ancient Greece.63 Moreover, in the eighteenth century several
and antiecclesiastical views .... David Hume... undermined the possibility of
natural religion and a providential understanding of the world by purporting to
demonstrate the invalidity of the standard arguments for the existence of God,
particularly the argument from design, which had played such a crucial role for the
seventeenth century mechanical philosophers.
Id.; Gregory, supra note 22, at 178 (focusing on the works of the eighteenth century
philosophers La Mettrie and D'Holbach in support of the idea that the period relied on
mechanical philosophy to promote a materialistic view of reality).
59. See, e.g., id. at 178-79 (describing the works of the experimentalist-clergyman-
materialist Priestley as a counterpart to the Christian materialism of Gassendi).
60. See Davis & Collins, supra note 54, at 201-03 (describing the evolution of naturalist
thought in the West and its culmination in scientific methodological naturalism).
61. See id. at 202-03 (discussing the movement of naturalism away from theology and
into a secular way of thought, separate from a theological underlying explanation); Henry, supra
note 4, at 182-83, 186-87 (discussing evolution of anticlericalism and secularization in
European science and society).
62. See Davis & Collins, supra note 54, at 203 (noting that Darwin's theory "played a
pivotal role in scientific naturalism's becoming the dominant worldview of the academy by the
middle of the twentieth century" and that "in every discipline today,... an ontological
naturalism is presupposed by most of the practitioners of these disciplines").
63. See id. at 201 (explaining that the Greek atomist Empedocles "assigned the origin of
all living things to a crude forerunner of evolution by survival of the fittest..." where "parts of
animals would form by chance and then come together; only those combinations of parts that fit
the right pattern were viable").
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naturalists, including Darwin's grandfather, had begun to put forward ideas and
theories suggesting that life originated and evolved over time from simple to
complex organisms through wholly natural processes-the most prominent
being the theory, developed by J. B. Lamarck, that different anatomic features
in animals developed in response to environmental needs and were then passed
on to their offspring.64 The pre-Origins of Species response to these ideas
varied; radical groups seeking social and political change seized on
"materialistic theories such as Lamarckian transformism to attack the image of a
static, designed universe that sustained the traditional social structure.
Evolutionism became firmly linked to materialism, atheism, and radical
politics." 65 Religiously-oriented naturalists either dismissed Lamarckian theory
and continued to insist that different species were the result of special creations
by God, or attempted to explain it as God's plan for the development of life on
66Earth. Included in this latter line of argument was the idea that even if
Lamarckian transformism was a natural process, gradual change to anatomical
structure to suit environmental need was a purposeful and progressive process
that constituted strong evidence of an intelligent Creator's plan for evolving
life.
67
What made Darwin's Origin of Species so controversial was that many
believed it made such religious views of human origins more difficult to
sustain. 68 Darwin's work not only presented new lines of evidence for the
evolution of species-thus further undermining arguments for "special
creations"-but it also set forth "a new and potentially more materialistic
mechanism of evolution,, 69 the theory of natural selection, which purportedly
undercut arguments defending evolution as a purposeful and progressive
process implemented by God.70 According to that theory, random physiological
64. See Bowler, supra note 4, at 459 ("By the end of the eighteenth century, Erasmus
Darwin... and Jean Baptiste Lamarck... were beginning to suggest comprehensive theories of
transmutation in which life had advanced slowly from primitive origins to its present level of
development."); Henry, supra note 4, at 187 (noting that biological evolutionism, "firmly based
on the self-organizing powers of matter, with a distinctly atheistic pedigree," was first suggested
by Erasmus Darwin and others and developed by Jean Baptiste Lamarck).
65. Bowler, supra note 4, at 459.
66. See id. (discussing naturalists' reactions to early evolutionist thought).
67. See id. (describing a book responding to early evolutionism that "proclaimed a
message of progress through nature and human history but attempted to circumvent the charge
that transmutationism was atheistic by arguing that progress represented the unfolding of a
divine plan programmed into nature from the beginning").
68. See id. at 459-61 (discussing the difficulty many theologians and philosophers
encountered in coping with Darwin's views of the origin of man).
69. Id. at 459.
70. ld.at459-61.
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variations in individual members of a species that conferred a reproductive
advantage would be passed on to future generations and could eventually result
in a new form of animal species-including, presumably, human beings.71 As
many viewed this theory, "[n]ot only were humans reduced to the status of
animals, but the natural world that produced us was reduced to a purposeless
sequence of accidental changes. 72 Such an unguided, materialist conception of
life was so distasteful to many that even leading adherents of evolution in the
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries refused to accept Darwinian
natural selection as the mechanism of evolutionary change.73 Indeed, even
though by 1870 "the vast majority of scientists and educated people had
accepted the basic idea of evolution,,74 most nineteenth-century scientists
continued to believe in a theistic version of it whereby God was responsible for
75that process.
Thus it was that Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection did not
become generally accepted by the scientific community until additional
evidence was put forth to support that mechanism some three-quarters of a
century after it was first proposed. Building on an increased understanding of
Mendelian genetics and the inheritability of genetic traits, population genetics,
and the paleontological record, several scientists in the 1930s and 1940s put
together what is known today as the neo-Darwinian synthesis-essentially
presenting a unified theory of how the underlying mechanisms of natural
selection operate.76 The purported explanatory power of this synthesis was
71. See id. at 460 ("Darwin deduced that there must be a 'struggle for existence,' in which
any slight advantage would be crucial. Those individuals with variant characters that conferred
such an advantage would survive and reproduce and, passing the character on to their offspring.
Those with harmful characters would be eliminated.").
72. Id.
73. Infra note 75.
74. Bowler, supra note 4, at 460.
75. See Jaki, supra note 54, at 49-50 (observing that while some of nineteenth-century
science was materialistic, "the majority of scientists during that century still adhered to...
Christian theism"); see also Numbers, supra note 7, at 313, 314 ("Although the overwhelming
majority of scientists after 1880 accepted a long earth history and some form of organic
evolution, many in the late nineteenth century expressed serious reservations about the ability of
Darwin's particular theory of natural selection to account for the origin of species.").
76. See Bowler, supra note 4, at 463 (noting that the emergence of modem genetics, by
undermining Lamarckism and supplying a plausible source of the random variation that Darwin
had noticed, had become increasingly popular in the 1930s); see also Martinez Hewlett,
Molecular Biology and Religion, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF RELIGION AND SCIENCE 172,
174-75 (Philip Clayton & Zachary Simpson eds., 2006) ("By 1942, Julian Huxley... could
tout what he called the 'modem synthesis,' in which the Darwinian model was merged with
Mendelian genetics and ideas about populations to produce an overarching paradigm that
subsumes the entire field of biology to the present.").
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sufficient to convince the bulk of scientists that natural selection was
indeed the mechanism by which evolution occurs.77 Not surprisingly, in
light of the history of the materialism-theism debate up to that point, this
development spawned new books by many scientists positing a materialistic
and atheistic account of the world and human existence.7 8 But this was not
business as usual. The new evolutionary synthesis set the stage for the first
serious attempts to work out and defend such an account "as a
comprehensive philosophy, especially with regard to ethics and our
understanding of the human mind ....79 Such attempts, moreover, were
not limited to the scientific community but were also made by other
members of the higher education academy.
80
B. American Contest Phase One: Creationists Attack Science
While such responses to the neo-Darwinian synthesis certainly
troubled many religionists in America, the ongoing debates over
evolutionary theory in this country had provoked a backlash from certain
religious groups even before the synthesis had emerged. Up until the late-
nineteenth century, debates about evolution had not provoked much of a
public reaction, in part because they were confined largely to scholarly
circles and even there many theologians were finding ways to
reconcile Christianity with evolutionary theory.81  But at least
77. See id. (finding that due to the emergence of modem genetics, "the biologists
themselves gradually began to believe that Darwinism might... be the most promising theory");
Davis & Collins, supra note 54, at 203 (noting that Darwin's theory "played a pivotal role in
scientific naturalism's becoming the dominant worldview of the academy by the middle of the
twentieth century").
78. See Bowler, supra note 4, at 463 ("But other founders of the modem synthesis,
especially George Gaylord Simpson. .. , argued that Darwinism is essentially materialistic:
There is no purpose in nature and no goal toward which evolution is striving .... "); see also
Stephen C. Meyer, The Demarcation of Science and Religion, in THE HISTORY OF SCIENCEAND
RELIGION IN THE WEsTERN TRADITION, supra note 1, at 17, 18 ("Francisco Ayala, Stephen Jay
Gould, William Provine, Douglas Futuyma, Richard Dawkins, Richard Lewontin, and the late
G. G. Simpson, for example, all agree that neo-Darwinism... postulates an exclusively
naturalistic mechanism of creation, one that allows no role for a directing intelligence.").
79. Davis & Collins, supra note 54, at 203.
80. See supra note 77.
81. See Numbers, supra note 7, at 314 ("The early Darwinian debates remained confined
largely to scholarly circles and often focused on issues pertaining to natural theology; thus,
those who objected to evolution primarily on biblical grounds saw little reason to participate.");
Szasz, supra note 29, at 292-93 (discussing the slow regional progression of controversy that
Darwin's evolutionary theory had on Protestantism).
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two developments occurred before the synthesis emerged to arouse certain
segments of the public against that theory. The first was the occurrence of
World War I with its brutality and apparent senselessness, which many
blamed in part on the spread of Darwin's theory and its perceived "survival
of the fittest" and "might makes right" sub-themes.82 More importantly,
however, public education in America, and especially at the high school
level, was undergoing a dramatic expansion at that time. 3 As part of this,
evolutionary theory was being spread farther and wider than ever before
through biology textbooks.8 4 These developments happened to coincide with
the rise of a Protestant evangelical movement in America, and in the early
1920s organized Christian fundamentalist groups began agitating for laws
prohibiting the teaching of evolution in American public schools.85  Of
course, this effort was not just the result of a perception that amoral and
atheistic overtones of evolutionary theory contributed to the first world war,
but also because of perceived conflicts between that theory and the account
of animal and human origins contained in the Bible's Book of Genesis.
Such agitation by Protestant fundamentalist groups bore fruit: In the
1920s it resulted in antievolution laws being debated in twenty state
legislatures, with three states (Arkansas, Mississippi, and Tennessee) passing
laws banning the public school teaching of evolution, one state (Oklahoma)
banning the adoption of public school textbooks containing evolutionary
theory, and one state (Florida) passing a resolution condemning the teaching
of Darwinism.86 The Tennessee law gave rise to the famous "Scopes monkey
trial" of 1925, in which the State prosecuted a public high school teacher for
82. See EDWARD J. LARSON, TRIAL AND ERROR: THE AMERICAN CONTROVERSY OVER
CREATION AND EVOLUTION 125 (3d ed. 2003) (commenting that historian George Marsden
"described the original anti-evolution crusade as a reaction against First World War German
'barbarism,' which at the time was widely attributed to the acceptance of a Nietzschean
evolutionary philosophy"); Szasz, supra note 29, at 294-95 (describing the Protestant rejection
of science and Darwinism that followed World War I).
83. See Numbers, supra note 7, at 315 ("The early twentieth century witnessed an
unprecedented expansion of public education--enrollment in public high schools nearly
doubled between 1920 and 1930 .... ).
84. See LARSON, supra note 82, at 24-25 ("Teaching journals, policies, and manuals
dating from the 1890s through the 1910s thus second the evidence from science textbooks that
evolutionary instruction penetrated public high-school life-science courses by the turn of the
century."); see also id. at 27 ("It was the expansion of public secondary education that carried
evolution to an increasing number of America's youth, and this expansion coincided with the
anti-evolution crusade.").
85. See id. at 40-48 (tracing the beginnings of the movement to abolish evolutionary
teaching back to the evangelicalism movement that began before World War I).
86. Numbers, supra note 7, at 314.
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teaching evolution in his class.87 Scopes was convicted at a trial that became a
"cause calibre" for religion versus science demagogues, but in an anticlimactic
ending the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the conviction on a sentencing
technicality even though it found nothing wrong with the verdict itself.88
When the fundamentalist push for antievolution laws in additional states
seemed to lose its steam around the end of the 1920s as the Great Depression
began, such groups shifted tactics to achieve their goals. Instead of
continuing to lobby for more antievolution laws, they pressured local school
boards and school textbook publishers to simply drop the teaching of
evolutionary theory from public school curricula. 89 As a result of these
efforts, evolutionary theory was mostly eliminated from biology and other
public high school textbooks across the country, and the fundamentalist
groups largely succeeded in accomplishing indirectly what they could not
accomplish more directly and broadly through additional legal prohibitions. 90
Thus, from the 1930s to the start of the 1960s, evolution was largely kept out
of public middle and high schools across the country by pressuring the public
education system to avoid the topic.
With the Soviet's launch of its Sputnik satellite in 1957 and the advent of
the American-Soviet space race, a new emphasis was placed on science education
in the United States.91 As part of the curricular and textbook reforms that
occurred in the early 1960s, evolutionary theory was added back into high school
biology textbooks.92 In Arkansas, the adoption of such a revised textbook
produced a clash with the law prohibiting the teaching of evolution that had
been adopted more than three decades earlier.93 This clash resulted in the U.S.
Supreme Court's first decision regarding the constitutionality of antievolution
laws, when in Epperson v. Arkansas94 it held that the State's law
87. See Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363, 363 (Tenn. 1927) (finding that Scopes was
indicted for "teach[ing] ... that man had descended from a lower order of animals").
88. See id. at 367 ("Since a jury alone can impose the penalty this act requires, and as a
matter of course no different penalty can be inflicted, the trial judge exceeded his jurisdiction in
levying this fine, and we are without power to correct his error. The judgment must accordingly
be reversed.").
89. LARSON, supra note 82, at 84-88.
90. Cf id. at 85 ("Shipley estimated that ... 70 percent of public high schools omitted
teaching evolution.").
91. See id. at 91 ("Sputnik captured the attention of the American people, creating
widespread support for improving science education.").
92. See id. at 95 ("(T]he BSCS texts successfully reintroduced evolution as the central
concept in biology instruction during the early 1960s.").
93. See generally Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
94. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
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prohibiting the teaching of evolution violated the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment.9 5 The Court reasoned that Arkansas's law had been
improperly motivated by religious protectionism-a desire to suppress the
teaching of a scientific theory that appeared to conflict with a sectarian
religious belief (i.e., the literal truth of the Book of Genesis).96 Evidence
cited by the Court in support of its decision included political advertisements
that were run to urge the adoption of the Arkansas law that equated
evolutionary teachings with an atheistic worldview.97
The Epperson decision caused fundamentalist groups to rethink their
tactics, but not their goal of opposing the teaching of evolution in the public
schools. Thus, they reasoned, if they could not get evolutionary teaching
banned they could at least mandate equal time for the teaching of their
favored version of human origins whenever evolutionary theory was taught.
At first this took the form of requiring the Genesis narrative to be presented
in textbooks whenever evolution was, but a federal appeals court quickly
dispatched a Tennessee law to this effect as a violation of the Establishment
Clause.98 Realizing that a direct teaching of Genesis, even as a counterpart to
a presentation of evolutionary theory, looked too much like teaching religion,
the focus then shifted to mandating equal time for the presentation of "creation
science"-purported scientific evidence supporting the Genesis origins
account-along with evolutionary teaching. In 1982, Arkansas's law along
these lines was struck down by a federal district court in a decision noted for
the thoroughness of its analysis. In McLean v. Arkansas Board ofEducation,
99
the court held that the law violated the Establishment Clause in several
respects: it was motivated by an improper purpose to advance fundamentalist
Christianity, it had a primary effect of advancing that religion in significant part
because creation science was not real science and therefore lacked any
95. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion... ."); Epperson, 393 U.S. at 109.
96. See Epperson, 393 U.S. at 107-10 (concluding that "[t]he law's effort was confined to
an attempt to blot out a particular theory [of the origin of man] because of its supposed conflict
with the Biblical account, literally read").
97. Id. at 108 n.16.
98. See Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485,489 (6th Cir. 1975) (invalidating the law in part
for giving preferential treatment to the Genesis account by excluding it from the requirement
that all textbook account of origins be expressly labeled as "theories" and not presented as
"scientific facts"), remanded to 399 F. Supp. 510 (M.D. Tenn. 1975).
99. See McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1272-73 (E.D. Ark. 1982)
(holding that statute requiring public schools to give balanced treatment to creation science and
to evolution science violated the First Amendment prohibition against establishment of
religion).
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educational value, and because any teaching of creation science would
necessarily create an excessive entanglement between the State and
religion.'°° Notably, in reaching its conclusions, the McLean court also cited
evidence of fundamentalist beliefs that acceptance of evolutionary theory was
tantamount to accepting an atheist or materialistic account of existence.1
0 1
In 1987, five years after McLean, Louisiana's "equal time for creation
science" law was taken up by the Supreme Court in Edwards v. Aguillard.'
0 2
Finding that "creation science" was essentially a religious viewpoint embodying
the concept that a supernatural being created humankind, and by implication
not a true scientific theory, the Court determined that the Louisiana legislature's
purpose in passing the law was to advance a religious belief.10 3 As such, the
Court held that the law violated the Establishment Clause.' 04 Once again, like
the courts in Epperson and McLean, in reaching its conclusion the Court cited
evidence that the law's supporters essentially equated evolutionary theory with
atheism and a materialistic worldview. 0 5 Not surprisingly, Edwards essentially
sounded the death knell for laws requiring the joint teaching of creation science
with evolution. 1
06
Thus, in mediating the contest between creationism and evolution, the law
started out in the 1920s favoring the former by banning the latter, and then
100. See id. at 1272 (concluding statute fails three-pronged establishment test).
101. See id. at 1266 ("The approach to teaching 'creation science' and 'evolution science'
found in Act 590 is... an extension of Fundamentalists' view that one must either accept the
literal interpretation of Genesis or else believe in the godless system of evolution."); id. at 1266
n.22 (noting that advocates of teaching creation science insisted "a true Christian cannot
compromise with the theory of evolution"); see also id. at 1259-61 (tracing the roots of
fundamentalism and creation science).
102. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
103. See id. at 593 ("In this case, the purpose of the Creationism Act was to restructure the
science curriculum to conform with a particular religious viewpoint."); see also Kitzmiller v.
Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 720 (M.D. Pa. 2005) ("The courts in Edwards and
McLean expressly found that [the involvement of a supernatural designer] removed creationism
from the realm of science and made it a religious proposition.").
104. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 597 ("The Act violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment because it seeks to employ the symbolic and financial support of government to
achieve a religious purpose.").
105. See id. at 591 n. 13 (noting legislator's view that the world is either created by a
creator or that it "just evolves"); id. at 592 ("According to Senator Keith, the theory of evolution
was consonant with the 'cardinal principle[s] of religious humanism, secular humanism,
theological liberalism, aetheistism [sic].'); id. at 592 n.14 (recounting legislator's personal
belief in creationism and his view that the battle over the bill was one between "God and anti-
God forces").
106. See, e.g., Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 718 ("Therefore, as noted, the import of
Edwards is that the Supreme Court made national the prohibition against teaching creation
science in the public school system.").
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from the 1960s through 1980s, essentially did an "about face" in favoring the
latter by banning the former. In the 1990s through today, however, the law,
through the vehicle of general educational reforms, has gone even further in
favoring evolutionary theory. Such reforms effectively require that evolution
be taught in public schools through the conditioning of federal education
funding on the adoption of state education standards and associated testing
requirements where those standards generally provide for teaching that
theory. 107 But these developments by no means diminished the fervor of groups
opposed to an uncritical presentation of evolutionary theory to middle and high
school science students. 10 8 They did, however, cause them to rethink their
strategies for accomplishing their goals.
C. Phase Two: Intelligent Design Attacks Science
While the Edwards case was pending, a group of scientists who believed
in some version of creation were working on a high-school biology textbook
supplement that purported to make a scientific case that purposeful creation
better explained scientific data related to living systems than an unguided
process of natural selection. After the Court's decision issued, the authors
substituted the phrase "intelligent design" for the now legally-suspect term
"creation" in their manuscript (and the phrase "design proponents" for the term
"creationists"), and published the book under the title Of Pandas and People:
The Central Question of Biological Origins.09 Thus, the intelligent design
movement was formally born in its modern incarnation."10 That movement
107. LARSON, supra note 82, at 196-209.
108. See, e.g., id. at 202 (describing "scattered state skirmishes" over science standards
following national standards legislation).
109. PERCIVAL DAVIS & DEAN H. KENYON, OF PANDAS AND PEOPLE: THE CENTRAL
QUESTION OF BIOLOGICAL ORIGINS (1989); see also Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F.
Supp. 2d 707, 721-22 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (explaining how the textbook was initially drafted as a
creationist text).
110. Although Of Pandas andPeople was the first book to explicitly promote "intelligent
design," the general lines of the argument for purposeful design of the universe have deeper
historical roots. Modernly, the 1984 book The Mystery ofLife's Origin attributed the complex
process of originating life to a divine creator. See RONALD L. NUMBERS, THE CREATIONISTS 373
(expanded ed. 2006) (noting work of three Protestant scientists attributing origination of life to
divine creator). This book, along with Michael Denton's Evolution: Theory in Crisis, attracted
little public attention, but helped to lay the intellectual foundation for the modem ID movement.
See id. at 373-74 (tracing the development of intelligent design). However, the idea that nature
is designed is older than any of these modem creationist articulations. The medieval
philosopher and theologian Thomas Aquinas argued, as one of his five ways to philosophically
demonstrate the existence of God, that wherever complex design exists, there must have been a
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gained significant momentum after the 1991 publication of a book by a
Berkeley law professor, Phillip Johnson, entitled Darwin on Trial."' In it,
Johnson applied his legal reasoning skills to take issue with a basic scientific
concept that he apparently believed was responsible for a trend towards
philosophical materialism in the scientific community-science's commitment
to methodological naturalism, or investigating and explaining natural
phenomenon solely as a matter of naturalistic causes or processes." 2  In
Johnson's view, scientific theories or explanations about the natural world
ought to make room for supernatural causation if that best explains the
scientific data-and particularly causation by an intelligent designer. 13 To
Johnson, it was critical to stem the scientific and cultural drift towards a purely
materialistic view of existence with its perceived detrimental impact on society
and culture, and to reverse its course back towards a theistic view of life and its
central premise that there is a supernatural creator-regardless of whether
creation happened in seven days or a much longer time through the
evolutionary process.'14
In addition to pushing this critique of methodological naturalism to
combat the philosophical naturalism or materialism of many scientists that
Johnson believed was seeping into mainstream scientific theories and
explanations of natural phenomena-and especially the neo-Darwinian
evolutionary synthesis-Johnson also assembled a group of younger Christian
academics, some of whom held advanced scientific degrees, to assist him in
moving science towards a greater receptivity of "intelligent design"
explanations for natural phenomena." 5 Some in this group secured funding to
start a center designed to promote intelligent design-called the Center for the
Renewal of Science and Culture ("CRSC"), a unit of a Seattle-based think tank
designer. See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 718 (noting testimony of theologian explaining
connection between intelligent design and theology of Thomas Aquinas). William Paley's
Natural Theology, published in 1802, argued that just as a watch's complexity (as contrasted
with a stone) naturally leads one to infer a designer, so too complexity in natural objects points
to a designer of nature. See KENNETH R. MILLER, ONLY A THEORY: EvOLUTION AND THE BATTLE
FOR AMERICA'S SOUL 21 (2008) (discussing William Paley's watch and stone analogy). For a
more complete discussion of the ID movement's intellectual predecessors, see id. at 20-24.
111. PHILLiP E. JOHNSON, DARwI ON TRIAL (1991).
112. Id. at 114-16.
113. Id. at 110, 154.
114. See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 719-20 (describing Johnson as the developer of
ID's so-called "Wedge Strategy," and its aim "to defeat scientific materialism and its destructive
moral, cultural, and political legacies and to replace materialistic explanations with the theistic
understanding that nature and human beings are created by God") (citations omitted).
115. See NUMBERS, supra note 110, at 380 (describing Johnson's growing organization of
intelligent design theorists).
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called the Discovery Institute-that most of these academics, including
Johnson, became affiliated with.l 6 Two members of the group that have been
particularly influential in attempting to promote intelligent design as a scientific
theory are Lehigh University biochemistry professor Michael Behe and
Southern Baptist Theological Seminary mathematician and philosophy
professor William Dembski.
In his 1996 book Darwin's Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to
Evolution, 17 Behe puts forth the argument of "irreducible complexity" to
criticize Darwinian evolution and support intelligent design. Behe points out
that the neo-Darwinian evolutionary mechanism of natural selection posits
random genetic mutations in an individual that cause anatomical changes which
are gradually taken up by his or her progeny, and then a wider population,
when they confer reproductive advantages or survival value on organisms." 8
From time to time, according to that theory, these changes eventually reach a
point when new species are created. 19 Behe, however, argues that the origins
of some complex life forms existing today cannot be explained by such a
process. 120  Like a mousetrap, he argues, some life forms comprised of
interacting parts do not function (or confer benefits or survival value) until all
of those parts are in place to operate together.' 2' When the parts standing alone
had no independent functional or survival benefit-as with a typical
mousetrap-they could not have developed under a natural selection
mechanism because they would have had no value to be incorporated into a
population in the first place.' 22 In other words, organisms or life processes
exhibiting irreducible complexity-when multiple parts have to be in place
before they function (and when the loss of a part will cause non-
functionality)-cannot evolve under natural selection when those parts have no
separate and independent survival value. Behe claims this is the case with
116. See id. at 381-82 (recounting creation of Center for the Renewal of Science and
Culture).
117. MICHAEL J. BEHE, DARwIN'S BLACK Box: THE BIOCHEMICAL CHALLENGE TO
EvoLutnoN (1996).
118. See id. at 4 (explaining neo-Darwinist theory).
119. See id. at 26 (noting idea that formation of new species is achieved through
accumulation of mutations).
120. See id. at 187 (arguing scientists are unable to give a detailed account of how certain
complex biological processes may have developed in a Darwinian fashion).
121. See id. at 42 (explaining mousetrap analogy).
122. See id. at 46-47 (arguing intact systems are irreducibly complex and cannot be created
by unconscious, small, successive steps).
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many complex organisms or biochemical processes he has studied. 123
124Therefore, an intelligent designer is the best explanation for their origins.
As one might expect from a mathematician, Dembski makes a related but
different argument for an intelligent designer that is grounded in that particular
discipline. In his 1998 book The Design Inference: Eliminating Chance
Through Small Probabilities125 and other writings, Dembski relies on
information and probability theory to argue that important biochemical
molecules, such as DNA, contain informational sequences or patterns that
exhibit both "complexity" and "specificity" that would be improbable results of
chance or the operation of natural laws. 126 By "complexity," Dembski is
referring to the exhibition of irregular sequences of information unlikely to
occur at random; 127 he defines "specified" as referring to a correlation between
patterns of information contained in such sequences and independent functional
requirements (e.g., the sequence performs a function such as communicating
information). 128 To illustrate, Dembski argues that "[a] single letter of the
alphabet is specified without being complex. A long sentence of random letters
is complex without being specified. A Shakespearean sonnet is both complex
and specified."'129 Thus, when molecules or other living things contain systems
or sequences exhibiting both complexity and specificity (i.e., "specified
complexity"), it is highly likely that they were purposely designed instead of
being the result of chance or the operation of unguided forces.
130
Although intelligent design proponents currently do not claim to advocate
the direct teaching of intelligent design as science in the public schools, 3 '-at
123. See id. at 204-05 (suggesting cilium, the blood-clotting system, and intracellular
transport systems as examples of complex systems that support the inference that they are
products of design).
124. See id. at 193 ("The conclusion of intelligent design flows naturally from the data
itself-not from sacred books or sectarian beliefs.").
125. WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, THE DESIGN INFERENCE: ELIMINATING CHANCE THROUGH SMALL
PROBABILITIES (1998)
126. See, e.g., WILLIAM DEMBSKI & JONATHAN WELLS, THE DESIGN OF LIFE: DISCOVERING
SIGNS OF INTELLIGENCE IN BIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS 168-75 (2008) (defining specified complexity
and discussing its implications for molecular biology).
127. Id. at 165.
128. Id. at 174.
129. WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, INTELLIGENT DESIGN: THE BRIDGE BETWEEN SCIENCE AND
THEOLOGY 47 (1999).
130. See, e.g., DEMBSKI & WELLS, supra note 126, at 180-83 (contrasting the design theory
explanation of irreducibly complex systems to Darwinist explanations).
131. See, e.g., http://www.discovery.org/csc/topQuestions.php (last visited Mar. 9, 2009)
(answering the question "Should public schools require the teaching of intelligent design?") (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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least unless and until they achieve some success in getting the scientific
community to change the ground rules of science to include supernatural
explanations of natural phenomena, which is one goal they have set for
themselves-they have adopted a strategy of claiming there is a "controversy"
relating to the validity of neo-Darwinian theory (based in part on Behe's and
Dembski's criticisms) and advocate that schools teach that controversy
(including, potentially, alternative explanations based on intelligent design)
when evolution is covered in science class. 32 A few school boards and
individual biology teachers that have attempted to implement this
recommendation have so far met with little success, being stymied by political
backlashes or legal actions reflecting strong opposition of the scientific
community to the notion that there is any controversy to teach about
evolutionary theory. 1
33
In one of the earliest attempts to alert students to such a controversy, in
1994 a school district in Louisiana adopted a policy requiring that a "disclaimer
from endorsement" of evolutionary theory be read to students prior to that
theory's presentation. 134 In pertinent part, that disclaimer advised students that
evolutionary theory "should be presented to inform students of the scientific
concept and not intended to influence or dissuade the Biblical version of
Creation or any other concept.' 35 A federal court of appeals held that the
disclaimer violated the Establishment Clause because its primary effect was to
advance a particular religion (i.e., Christianity).136 Interestingly, on appeal to
the Supreme Court, two Justices that dissented in Edwards, joined by another
Justice that had not been on the Court then, voted to grant certiorari in the case,
but came up one vote short. 137 Nonetheless, they filed a vigorous dissent to the
denial of the appeal, accusing the other members of the Court of standing by
and permitting "a Court of Appeals to push the much beloved secular legend of
132. See infra note 268 and accompanying text; see also LARSON, supra note 82, at 202-
05.
133. NUMBERS, supra note 110, at 386-98 (describing little actual success for the "teach
the controversy" strategy, but noting that ID proponents have scored a significant public
relations victory in "convincing the public and press that a serious science controversy exist[s]
about the status of Darwinism."); see also LARSON, supra note 82, at 205-09.
134. See Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337, 341 (5th Cir. 1999)
(enjoining school board from requiring disclaimer be read before teaching evolution).
135. Id.
136. See id. at 348 ("As such, we conclude that the disclaimer impermissibly advances
religion, thereby violating the second prong of the Lemon test as well as the endorsement test.").
137. See Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ. v. Freiler, 530 U.S. 1251, 1251(2000)(Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (opposing denial of certiorari) (criticizing Fifth Circuit's application of the Lemon
test). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined Scalia in dissenting from the denial,
leaving that group one vote short of the four necessary for the Court to grant certiorari in a case.
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the Monkey Trial one step further."'' 38 Today, only nine years later, a more
conservative Court may very well have heard the case and reversed the lower
court's decision. Thus, it is very possible that the Court may bust ajar the door
Edwards closed to teaching some version of the purported "controversy" over
evolution in the near future.
In a more recent and much publicized lawsuit contesting an attempt to
teach challenges to evolutionary theory that explicitly involved intelligent
design, the latter ideas were subjected to direct and probing legal scrutiny for
the first time. In 2004, the school board for Dover, Pennsylvania adopted a
resolution decreeing that students would be made aware of "gaps/problems in
Darwin's theory and of other theories of evolution including, but not limited to,
intelligent design."' 39 To implement this policy, the school district announced
that students in the ninth-grade biology class would be read a fairly lengthy
statement that, among other things, referred to "Darwin's Theory" and
proclaimed that "[t]he Theory is not a fact. Gaps in the Theory exist for which
there is no evidence .... Intelligent Design is an explanation of the origin of
life that differs from Darwin's view. The reference book, Of Pandas and
People, is available for students who might be interested in gaining an
understanding of what Intelligent Design actually involves."
40
Upon a challenge to these actions, a federal district court held that they
violated the Establishment Clause for several reasons. First, after reviewing
evidence tying intelligent design to creationist ideas and groups, and the school
board actions undertaken in adopting the challenged policy, the court
determined the board appeared to be endorsing religion by adopting it.' 41 In
addition, the court concluded that the policy impermissibly endorsed religion
because intelligent design was a religious argument rather than a legitimate
scientific theory. 142 Finally, the court held that in adopting the policy the
school board had an unconstitutional purpose and effect of imposing "a
religious view of biological origins into the biology course." 143 Similar to cases
involving creationism, in making its determination regarding the religious
nature of intelligent design theory, the court cited evidence indicating that its
138. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 708 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
140. Id. at 708-09.
141. See id. at 734-35 (concluding average member of community would perceive school
board's actions to be an endorsement of religion).
142. See id. at 718-23 (tracing intelligent design's origins to theological arguments).
143. Id. at 746-64.
66 WASH. & LEE L. REV 587 (2009)
proponents were motivated strongly by the perceived materialistic and atheistic
beliefs of scientists and others who promote or accept Darwinian evolution.'"
Even before the district court's decision in Kitzmiller was issued, citizens
of Dover who were annoyed at becoming the locale of a modem "Scopes
monkey trial" voted the school board proponents of the new policy out of
office. 145 Thus, it is not clear what the future holds for the intelligent design
movement, but particularly in light of the three-Justice dissent to the denial of
certiorari in the Louisiana disclaimer case, and the recent increase in solidly
conservative Justices on the Court, it seems clear that one district court decision
will not destroy the movement or even detain it for long. Moreover, it is likely
that even traditional creationists have taken heart from the Louisiana case, and
will continue efforts designed to "teach the controversy" from a Biblical
perspective. Indeed, all evidence indicates that creationism is again on the rise
in America, and even gaining an increasing number of adherents at an
international level. 146
D. Phase Three: Science's Assault on the Religious Worldview
Perhaps sensing that creationists and intelligent design proponents will not
be throwing in the towel anytime soon, in the last couple of years a number of
avowed atheist authors-including those trained in science and those
possessing other backgrounds-have launched a major and vehement
144. See id. at 720 (citing proponents' document referring to the "destructive moral,
cultural and political legacies" of scientific materialism, and the need to "replace materialistic
explanations with the theistic understanding that nature and human beings are created by God");
see also id. at 729-31 (describing ID proponents' claims about atheistic implications of
evolution); id. at 737 (quoting governing goals of the think tank supporting intelligent design as
being to replace materialistic explanations on origin of humans); id at 737 n. 14 (noting the
strategic plan of intelligent design advocacy group explained the "devastating" effects
materialism has had); id. at 762 (stating that opponents to the intelligent design curriculum had
been called atheists).
145. See NUMBERS, supra note 110, at 393 ("[The citizens of Dover, irritated at becoming
the Dayton of the North, went to the polls and voted out of office all of the old Pro-ID school-
board members.").
146. See id. at 399-431; id. at 399 ("In the past few decades [antievolutionism] has quietly
spread from America throughout the world and from evangelical Protestantism to Catholicism,
Eastern Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, and even Hinduism."); see also Jens Lubbadeh, European
Creationists Take on Darwin, SPIEGEL ONLINE, Feb. 25, 2009, http://www.spiegel.de/
international/zeitgeist/0, 1518,609712,00.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2009) ("The US isn't the
only place with heated debates about Darwin's theory of evolution: Europe has its own
hardcore creationists and intelligent design backers, too. Increasingly, they are making their
voices heard.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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counteroffensive to put them, and religionists in general, on the defensive. 1
47
At least five such books have reached various bestsellers' lists since 2005.148
The leader of these authors is Richard Dawkins, an Oxford professor trained in
zoology but who has spent most of his professional life writing books critical of
religion and arguing that Darwinian evolution, as well as other modem
scientific advances, support a wholly materialistic view of existence. 149 In his
2006 book, The God Delusion, Dawkins elaborates on these arguments, hoping
with his new book to take advantage of, as he sees it, a potential "critical mass
for the initiation of a chain reaction" for "coming out of the closet" and
revealing oneself as the atheist he or she truly and most logically is. 50
As might be predicted, these books have prompted others-again,
including those with and without scientific training-to respond with books of
their own. 151 The leading response by a practicing scientist comes from Francis
Collins, the former head of the U.S. Government's National Human Genome
Research Institute, in his 2006 book The Language of God: A Scientist
Presents Evidence for Belief.152 In it, Collins aims to counter the Dawkinsian
view "that a belief in evolution demands atheism"'153 and to provide a "synthesis
of the scientific and spiritual worldviews" by arguing that "belief in God can be
an entirely rational choice, and that the principles of faith are, in fact,
complementary with the principles of science."' 54 And if all of these recent
books on the materialism-theism divide constitute a landslide of debate, the
reactions of the mainstream media represent no less than an avalanche. The
147. See, e.g., Rachel Zoll, Atheists in the Bully Pulpit; Many Books Decrying Religion's
Negative Influence on the WorldAre Bestsellers, L.A. TIMES, May 26, 2007, at E12 (asserting
that "[m]ilitant, atheist writers are making an all-out assault on religious faith and reaching the
top of the bestseller list, a sign of widespread resentment over the influence of religion in the
world among nonbelievers").
148. See, e.g., Ronald Aronson, The New Atheists; A Wave of Pugnacious Unbelievers
Have Written Must-Read Books for Americans Fed Up with In-Your-Face Religion, CM. SUN
TIMES, June 17, 2007, at B 1 ("No fewer than five books by the New Atheists have appeared on
best-seller lists in the past two years .. ").
149. See, e.g., COLLINS, supra note 20, at 4 ("[T]he prominent evolutionist Richard
Dawkins has emerged as the leading spokesperson for the point of view that a belief in evolution
demands atheism.").
150. DAWKINS, supra note 17, at 4.
151. See, e.g., Lisa Anderson, A Firestorm over Plans to Teach Intelligent Design, CHI.
TRIn., Feb. 4,2007, Books, at 6; David P. Barash, The DNA ofReligious Faith, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Apr. 20, 2007, at B6.
152. See COLLINS, supra note 20, at 3 (advocating the compatibility of a belief in God with
a belief in biological evolution).
153. Id. at 4.
154. Id. at3.
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reporting on, and review of, these books has been vigorous, and few subjects
have prompted so many op-ed columnists and other media voices to join the
fray.1
55
In sum, it is evident that the BIG QUESTION posed at the start of this
Article strikes a deep and enduring chord in our society-within individual
citizens and in our culture in general. As we have seen, the differing answers
to that question have spurred vigorous philosophic, scientific and cultural
debate since the dawn of Western civilization, and it shows no indication of
easing in the modem age. 56  If anything, as evolutionary biologists and
neuroscientists increasingly assert claims that human behaviors, emotions and
thoughts-indeed, human religious convictions-can be explained through
entirely natural processes, this debate only promises to strengthen and become
more entrenched (and, unfortunately, more acrimonious). 157  That is not
surprising, for as Francis Collins asserts in The Language of God, "[w]hether
we call it by name or not, all of us have arrived at a certain worldview. It helps
us make sense of the world around us, provides us with an ethical framework,
and guides our decisions about the future."'' 58  As Collins suggests, the
difference between materialistic and theistic worldviews can be critical to a
person's approach to life.159 In a created universe, one is logically accountable
for his or her life to the Creator that brought him or her into existence. This
means that such a person's life will likely be meaningfully influenced by his or
her views of what that Creator expects or demands-whether or not others
might view those expectations or demands as being good or evil. In a universe
governed solely by mechanistic processes, one is logically accountable to the
dictates of one's own conscience-and to whatever influences have helped to
shape and mold it-to guide and assess the value and meaning of one's life.
Either way, it is clear that one's beliefs about the nature of human origins can
be fundamental to his or her view of life and existence.
155. See, e.g., Julia Keller, Atheists, Let the Mystery Be; Why Do the Writers of Recent
Popular Books on Atheism Fume over Others'Beliefs? Why Not Shake Your Head and Move
On?, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2008, at E13 (responding to the recent books on the materialism-
theism divide by asking materialists to "let the mystery be"); Lee Siegel, Op-Ed., Do We Need
Faith? Believe It; A Flurry of Literary Attacks on God May Also Be Closing the Book on
Imagination, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2007, at M8 (advocating the necessity of faith in the face of
materialism); Aronson, supra note 148 (reporting the success of materialistic novels); Peter
Steinfels, Books on Atheism Are Raising Hackles in Unlikely Places, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3,2007,
at B5 (reporting on current conflicts highlighted by the success of materialist novels).
156. See supra Part II.A (tracing the history of the debate from the ancient Greeks).
157. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (noting the works of the so-called "four
horsemen").
158. COLLINS, supra note 20, at 6; supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
159. COLLINS, supra note 20, at 6.
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It is not surprising, then, that there are parents and others who are
concerned about, and even seek to influence, what our youths are taught about
such a matter given its potential to shape worldview development-and
particularly as it is taught within public education because this is one of our
main institutions for preparing individuals for life as adults and for participation
in civil society. 160 In particular, one can understand concerns that the only
account of human origins public school students normally receive is a purely
naturalistic one in the science classroom. 16  This is especially true because
many parents, and certainly most high school students, do not appreciate the
fact that such a presentation is not intended to slight non-scientific perspectives
on this issue but rather is the result of what science is-a method for explaining
what happens in the natural world by reference to evidence gained from it that
can be widely tested and verified.
Once this is explained and understood, however, one might expect the
response of those concerned to be: "All right. Then let's make sure students
understand the specialized nature of the scientific inquiry, and teach them
additional perspectives on origins in a class more suitable to that purpose." But
as the American litigation experience with creationism and intelligent design
indicates, this has not been the general response. 162 This raises the question of
why this is so: Why have creationism and intelligent design proponents been
so insistent that alternative origins accounts be taught as science, or at least
discussed in the science classroom? And given this insistence, even if the
Court were to open the door from an Establishment Clause perspective to
teaching a purported controversy about evolution in science courses, would it
go so far as to permit creationist or intelligent design critiques of that theory in
the context of a science class? The answer to this last question depends,
presumably, on whether or not such critiques were deemed to be scientific. It is
to both of these questions that this Article now turns.
160. See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 25, at 23 ("Clearly, American education serves
multiple, overlapping objectives. These include developing the vocational skills of students,
their capacity for choice, their ability to participate in enriching activities, their civic virtue, and
their moral character.").
161. See, e.g., NAT'L COMM. ON Sci. EDUC. STANDARDS & ASSESSMENT, NAT'L RESEARCH
COuNcIL, NATIONAL SCIENCE EDUCATION STANDARDS 181-86 (1996) (emphasizing the
importance of improving educational methods to teach evolution and natural selection as a life
science).
162. See supra Parts II.B & II.C (outlining America's litigation experience with
creationism and intelligent design).
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111. The Future of Creationism and Intelligent Design in the Science
Classroom, and the Proper Place To Teach Origins in the Public
School Curriculum
A. Why Insistence on Teaching Religion as Science?
As described earlier, creationism proponents, and more recently intelligent
design proponents, have waged expensive and time-consuming litigation to
either have their version of human origins taught alongside evolution in science
courses, or at least to have the teaching of the latter qualified by disclaimers
alerting students to its "theoretical" nature and to alternative explanations for
human origins. 163 But since the Supreme Court said early on, at least in dicta,
that there is no Establishment Clause problem with teaching students about
religious doctrines and beliefs rather than teaching them as true (informing
versus persuading), one might wonder why they have not focused on teaching
their alternative origins perspectives in non-science classes instead of waging
costly and protracted battles over what is presented in science class.'6 There
are a number of possible explanations for this. For creationists, it might simply
be a matter of inertia. Since the subject of evolution arose as science and was
taught as such, they targeted their initial successful efforts to ban the subject in
that course. 165 When Epperson was decided and thwarted that tactic, inertia
dictated continuing to fight the battle in that course by mandating equal time for
their origins accounts.1 66 However, historical circumstance does not explain the
targeting of science and its teachings by intelligent design proponents (in fact,
after Edwards, one would have thought this strategy might be very difficult if
not self-defeating), and one suspects more was motivating the creationist
strategy as well.
Indeed, another explanation for the "science strategy," at least for
intelligent design proponents and the "creation science" efforts of creationists,
is that they truly believe their origins theories and evidence are scientific.
167
163. See supra notes 99-106, 134-45 and accompanying text (summarizing creationists'
unsuccessful attempts to mandate equal time in the classroom for creation science in McLean
and Edwards and religionists' unsuccessful attempts to mandate disclaimers in Freiler and
Kitzmiller).
164. See infra note 329 and accompanying text (noting the Court's intimation in Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), that teaching about religion is constitutional).
165. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (describing creationists' attempts to
criminalize teaching evolution and pressure public educators to avoid the subject).
166. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text (discussing Epperson and creationists'
subsequent attempts to mandate equal time).
167. See, e.g., supra notes 115-30 and accompanying text (discussing the purportedly
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Certainly both groups tried to make this case in Edwards and Kitzmiller,
respectively, where the courts, at least, did not think they succeeded. 68 And as
I will discuss later, given the nature of their arguments along these lines, both
groups must have entertained-and probably still do-at least some doubt
about the merit of those contentions when viewed in the light of conventional
understandings about the nature of the scientific enterprise in this country.
Maybe an even more plausible explanation is that, as indicated above, under the
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence religious views cannot be taught as
truth while scientific views can. 169 This in itself may seem a little odd at first,
but given the nature of the religious and scientific enterprises that will be
discussed in more detail later, it is understandable. 7 °
Science is a method for obtaining a wide, objective consensus on "some"
truth-truth about the physical and social worlds based on the study and
verification of empirical evidence.'17 So in teaching science as at least part of
the "truth portrait," educators stand on relatively firm ground. Religion, on the
other hand, most commonly refers to a personal or institutionalized set of
beliefs in a supernatural being and reality. 172 By definition, the supernatural
generally refers to purported non-material realities that cannot be detected
through empirical observation or sensory perceptions. 173 Thus, although many
claim that religion can lead to truths about spiritual or other non-material planes
of reality, such truths are normally accessed through asserted divine revelation
(at the level of organized religion) or an individual's experiences, insights and
interpretations of them (at a more personal level). As such, religion is not a
standardized methodology to be followed in order to achieve wide consensus
on certain truths, but rather is a description for a set of beliefs (no matter how
acquired) that tend to be much more varied and subjective in nature. 174 There
scientific theories of ID proponents Behe and Dembski).
168. See supra notes 102-06, 139-44 and accompanying text (discussing Edwards and
Kitzmiller, respectively, at greater length).
169. Supra note 36 and accompanying text.
170. See infra Part III.B (discussing the nature of the religious and scientific enterprises).
171. See infra notes 180-90 and accompanying text (providing a definition for the
scientific enterprise).
172. See, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1051 (11th ed. 2006)
(defining "religion" as "the service and worship of God or the supernatural").
173. Cf Davis & Collins, supra note 54, at 203 ("[A] largely unspoken rule in both the
sciences and the humanities is that, insofar as one attempts to explain human behavior or beliefs,
they must be explained by natural causes, not by appealing to such things as an immaterial soul
or a transcendent ethical or supernatural order .. ").
174. Cf Meyer, supra note 78, at 17 ("According to both [Kierkegaard and Buber],
scientific knowledge is impersonal and objective, whereas religious knowledge is personal and
subjective .... Religion... involves a personal relationship with the object known (God) and
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may indeed be, as religionists contend, other planes of objective reality in
addition to the world of matter and energy, but our "tools" for accessing such
planes are not as readily available to us as our physical senses are for accessing
the latter world. Hence, there tends to be much more personal experience and
interpretation involved in getting at the truths of such realities, and much more
difficulty achieving consensus about what those truths are (at least as compared
to scientific truths). That is essentially why the law permits science to be taught
as truth under the aegis of government authority or endorsement, but bars
religious views from being so taught-and to allow individuals maximum
freedom to decide upon religious truths for themselves.
Thus, it may be that when creationists and intelligent design advocates
target science classes for the teaching of their origins perspectives, they are
seeking to gain a piece of this institutionalized or established truth monopoly.
This point is related to, and leads to, probably the most compelling explanation
for such targeting. In the eyes of many religionists, ever since the
Enlightenment purportedly rescued human inquiry and knowledge from the
asserted "chains" placed upon it by institutionalized religious authority,
scientific inquiry and knowledge have enjoyed a distinct prestige or prominence
in Western thought that is suggested by the rhetoric of "enlightenment."'1
75
Hence, whatever knowledge is gained scientifically is treated as being
epistemologically superior to knowledge gained through religious experience or
revelation. 7 6  After all, many contend, scientific knowledge has allowed
humans to visit the moon, eradicate disease, and produce the wonders of the
a personal or moral response to him. Therefore, radical subjectivity characterizes religious
endeavor.").
175. See, e.g., MORTIMER J. ADLER, THE FOuR DIMENSIONS OF PHILOSOPHY 49 (1993).
Adler states:
We live in a culture in which science, along with its applications in ever more
powerful technology, predominates. The glorification and adulation of science give
the word "scientific" its eulogistic connotation. Other forms of intellectual
endeavor call themselves "scientific" when, in fact, their mode of inquiry, which
may be investigative, is not scientific at all in method or aim. The adjective
"scientific" has almost become a synonym for "excellent"-for "trustworthy" and
"reliable."
Id.
176. See, e.g., Suppe, supra note 45, at 24-29 (observing that "[iun recent generations, the
understanding [of reality] that religion provides has been increasingly stigmatized as inferior to
that of science. Where the two clash, religious understanding has usually suffered, for religious
beliefs are frequently taken to be merely matters of faith, whereas science is said to yield
knowledge," but also concluding that "[c]ontemporary debates over the compatibility of science
and religion have been poorly informed by the epistemology literature-a literature that gives
little consolation to those who seek to find radical disparities in the qualities of knowledge that
religion and science are capable of providing.").
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technological age-in short, it has permitted humankind to understand, control,
and alter the material world for its benefit. 177  What religious forms of
knowledge have ever produced such practical and useful benefits that impact
life in such perceptible ways? As intelligent design proponent William
Dembski has asserted in arguing that intelligent design should be taught as
science and not religion, claims to the contrary fail "to recognize the immense
cultural prestige which our society accords to science, but denies to
religion .... [T]he only universally valid form of knowledge within our
society is science."'178 In short, in the eyes of many religionists, because
Western society places a higher value on scientific rather than religiously
derived knowledge, the teaching of intelligent design or other religious
perspectives on origins in a non-science class would represent a "surrender" to
the "over-inflated role of science within our society."'
179
One obvious response to this last argument for insisting that creationist
and intelligent design views be taught in science courses is that if they do not
qualify as science, then the answer is not to attempt to alter or stretch the
definition of science to include such views, but rather to persuade society of the
equal or greater validity and worth of religiously-derived knowledge. But
before elaborating on this potential critique of the creationist and intelligent
design "science course" strategy, it is only fair to first examine whether the
theories of origins and associated critiques of evolutionary theory posited by
these groups and claimed to be "scientific" truly fit that appellation.
B. Do Creationism, Intelligent Design, and Their Critiques of Evolutionary
Theory Belong in the Science Classroom?
Although philosophers of science and the scientific community itself have
long debated the precise nature of the scientific enterprise, simply speaking
science "might be described as a set of activities designed to study or
investigate a topic about the natural or social worlds using the methods of
science." 180 While just what those methods are has been part of that debate,
with many engaged in the "hard" natural sciences insisting on a rigorous
177. See supra note 175; see also COLLINS, supra note 20, at 1-2 (celebrating the success
of the Human Genome Project and attributing that success, in part, to scientific knowledge).
178. William A. Dembski, Teaching Intelligent Design as Religion or Science?,
PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REV., May 1996, at 14, 15.
179. Id.
180. Barry P. McDonald, Government Regulation or Other "Abridgements" of Scientific
Research: The Proper Scope of Judicial Review Under the First Amendment, 54 EMORY L.J.
979, 987 (2005).
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adherence to the classical "scientific method" involving "a strict protocol of
hypothesis formulation and controlled experimentation,"' 81 today the accepted
definition of science seems to be also making room for the "softer" social
sciences that utilize "reliable, empirically derived data and unbiased, rigorous
techniques for testing that data."' 82 In both cases, the "emphasis [is] on the
systematic collection or generation of empirical data (i.e., information based on
human observation of [, or experimentation with,] events or phenomena in the
perceivable world)... [and] the utilization of unbiased and rigorous modes of
testing, analysis, and evaluation to draw inferences and conclusions about those
data.' 83 Such methods are designed to produce "universal" knowledge that is
"testable and reliable. . [consisting of] claims.., about the world [that] are
subject to empirical tests and ... characterized by empirical objectivity.
' 84
Further, "the dissemination of scientific findings to the scientific community for
[its] scrutiny and assessment [or validation] increases the legitimacy of claims
that such findings constitute scientific knowledge."' 85 Accordingly, at least as
to natural sciences such as biology where creationist and ID proponents are
seeking to have their theories treated as science, we can say that science is a
process designed to investigate the natural world in a rigorous, disciplined way,
and to achieve universal consensus on objective truths regarding that world.
Such scientific knowledge, then, essentially consists of information and
ideas-normally in the form of facts or theories-about the natural world that
have been examined by scientists using such methods and accepted as the most
objective and accurate description of it that is presently available. 8 6 But as
suggested by this definition of science, knowledge does not break down into
tidy categories of being scientific or nonscientific. Rather, science is an
iterative process consisting of continual investigation, analysis, and
communication, where consensuses about facts or theories emerge gradually
and frequently get undermined or reshaped by new discoveries and findings.' 
87
Thus, instead of having black and white boundaries, knowledge becomes
scientific by degrees depending on the breadth of its acceptance at any given
181. Id. at988.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 989.
184. Id. (quotations and footnotes omitted).
185. Id. at 991.
186. See id. (listing the "main activities... essential to the production of 'scientific'
knowledge," namely "formulation of a subject of inquiry and propositions to be tested," "actual
testing of those propositions," critically analyzing the data to assess the validity of those
propositions, and communicating a report to the scientific community).
187. Id. at 990-92.
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time by the relevant scientific community.188  In other words, purported
knowledge may have no scientific basis, some scientific basis, or a strong
scientific foundation depending upon its vetting and support within such
communities. 89 In sum, science is a communal and evolving enterprise, and
scientific knowledge is defined by reference to the degree of that community's
acceptance of certain facts or theories at a given point in time.190
Evolutionary theory, then, at least in the form of its modem synthesis
involving Darwin's theory of natural selection as it has been supplemented by
advances and discoveries in the genetic sciences and modem paleontology,
represents the scientific community's current and best explanation of the
origins of species (including humans) and development of life over time-at
least "best" in terms of being derived from empirical observation and analysis
of evidence from the natural world, and enjoying the strongest scientific
consensus at this time as the explanation of those phenomena that best fits the
data.' 9' It is important in the context of the current discussion, however, to
identify what claims about evolution science does and does not make.
As noted earlier, science (at least as to the natural sciences relevant here)
is committed to what is referred to as "methodological naturalism"-a
fundamental assumption that observable or perceivable phenomena are
explainable solely by natural laws and causes; reference to supernatural
causation or direction is beyond the scope of this enterprise.192 Such an
assumption, it is commonly argued, is necessary in order for science to be
188. See id. at 990 ("[T]he more new findings are disseminated and independently verified
by the scientific community[,] the more valid and reliable such knowledge is considered to
be.").
189. See id. (suggesting that support of the scientific community determines, at least in
part, the validity of the scientific basis of the knowledge).
190. See id. ("[A]n individual researcher's findings do not become scientific knowledge
until they are collectively judged, sorted and selectively incorporated into the consensual but
ever evolving scientific worldview.") (quotations omitted).
191. See infra note 207 and accompanying text (emphasizing the overwhelming acceptance
of evolution as the dominant scientific theory).
192. See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 735. As the court in Kitzmiller stated:
Methodological naturalism is a 'ground rule' of science today which requires
scientists to seek explanations in the world around us based upon what we can
observe, test, replicate, and verify. In science, explanations are restricted to those
that can be inferred from the confirmable data-the results obtained through
observations and experiments that can be substantiated by other scientists.
Anything that can be observed or measured is amenable to scientific investigation.
Explanations that cannot be based upon empirical evidence are not part of science.
Id.; see also GREENAWALT, supra note 25, at 97-98 (explaining that a methodological naturalist
"approach[es] scientific problems on the assumption that physical events have natural causes
and can be explained according to uniform laws that need not refer to anything supernatural").
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effective; scientific inquiry must search more deeply for naturalistic causes
instead of "stopping short" based on claims about supernatural causation that
cannot be verified empirically and might ultimately be false. 93 Of course, the
obvious potential cost associated with this asserted benefit is that science will
miss, or wrongly deny, supernatural causation in cases where it may exist (and,
conversely, make incorrect claims about the operation of the natural world in
such cases). 194  Nevertheless, methodological naturalism has become an
established tenet of science and the scientific method. 95
Thus, in approaching the question of the creation and development of life
on Earth, science is purposefully seeking wholly naturalistic explanations.1
96
This alone is a vital limiting principle on the search for truth in this area;
science is intentionally biased towards finding naturalistic explanations. 97 This
may all be well and good, but it counsels that scientists working in this area-
particularly given the difficulties inherent in studying a theory such as evolution
that purportedly operates over vast temporal and spatial dimensions and cannot
be readily tested and verified in the lab-be especially careful that its claims to
truth about natural causation are amply supported by the relevant scientific
communities. It also counsels that those being taught evolutionary science, and
particularly impressionable youths in the science classroom, be fully informed
of this inherent bias of scientific inquiry. Moreover, it counsels that truth
claims in this area be carefully delineated (and marked off from mere scientific
conjecture), and that particular attention be paid to their manner of presentation
193. See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 736. As the court in Kitzmiller stated:
The rigorous attachment to 'natural' explanations is an essential attribute to science
by definition and by convention. We are in agreement with... Dr. Miller, that
from a practical perspective, attributing unsolved problems about nature to causes
and forces that lie outside the natural world is a "science stopper." As [he]
explained, once you attribute a cause to an untestable supernatural force, a
proposition that cannot be disproven, there is no reason to continue seeking natural
explanations as we have our answer.
Id. (citations omitted); GREENAWALT, supra note 25, at 97 ("Methodological naturalism has
proven very productive; scientists have discovered natural explanations for countless
phenomena not previously explicable according to scientific principles.").
194. Cf, e.g., MARK IsAAK, THE COUNTER-CREATIONISM HANDBOOK 26 (2007) ("If we do
miss a supernatural explanation, so what? Supernatural explanations cannot be generalized, so
the explanation does not matter anywhere else. The usefulness of science comes from the ability
to apply findings to different areas. Any supernatural explanation would be useless.").
195. Supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text; see also Davis & Collins, supra note 60,
at 206 ("[S]cientific naturalism, particularly in its methodological and mechanistic varieties,
dominates in the academy .... ).
196. Supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
197. Id.
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in order to avoid thwarting the implementation of such measures through
inadvertent contextual obfuscation or misrepresentation.
In any event, it seems clear that the most important limitation on scientific
inquiry and knowledge in the area of evolution and human origins is that, even
if the empirical evidence regarding a claim pointed to supernatural causation
(or if a theory of such causation best explained certain data), it would simply be
beyond the scope and competence of science to recognize or acknowledge that
fact. 198 In other words, under its own ground rules science excludes religious
views from classrooms where it is taught. 199 But this is not the only limitation
science operates under as it pertains to the subject of evolution. Even when it
claims that the evolutionary process, or parts thereof, can be explained by
certain laws or mechanics of nature, science normally does not go further to ask
the deeper question of why those laws or mechanics exist or operate as they do
in the first place-it mainly takes nature as it is and seeks to understand and
explain its operation. 200 Thus it is technically irrelevant to science whether a
supreme being created such a world, or whether it arose merely from the
interaction of impersonal forces and organized itself into certain patterns and
other cause-effect relationships.2°'
Moreover, as discussed above, science can only claim valid knowledge
about a fact or theory when the latter is sufficiently supported by empirical
evidence and a consensus of the relevant scientific community.2°2 While the
mechanics of natural selection and the origin of different species as explained
by the neo-Darwinian synthesis appear to meet this standard today, the question
of how life itself began in the first place, for instance, plainly does not.
20 3
Thus, it would be illegitimate for science to make claims about the latter
question without appropriate qualifications and disclaimers regarding their
198. Cf IsAAK, supra note 194, at 26 ("We cannot observe the supernatural, so the only
way we could reach the supernatural explanation would be to eliminate all natural explanations.
But we can never know that we have eliminated all possibilities. Even if a supernatural
explanation is correct, we can never reach it.").
199. Id.
200. See GREENAWALT, supra note 25, at 113 ("Science cannot explain why anything at all
exists, why our lives have meaning, if they do, and why we should be ethical.").
201. Id.
202. See supra notes 180-90 and accompanying text (examining the scientific enterprise).
203. See, e.g., ANDREw H. KNOLL, LIFE ON A YOUNG PLANET: THE FIRST THREE BILLION
YEARS OF EVOLUTION ON EARTH 72 (2003) ("In general terms, we understand how biological
molecules might have evolved from simpler precursors present on the early Earth. But how
proteins, nucleic acids, and membranes came to interact so intricately remains a mystery.").
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speculative nature. The same can be said about the question of the origin of our
universe itself.
2°4
Lastly, if science rules out considering or making claims about the
existence of supernatural causation to explain the world, any assertions science
were to make about the nonexistence of such causation-at least as to questions
of ultimate causation regarding why the physical world operates in the way
science describes-would similarly be beyond its competence and scope
despite the attempts of many scientifically-trained commentators, such as
Richard Dawkins, to use science in support of their materialistic worldviews. °5
Thus, efforts of many today to turn science's methodological naturalism into an
ontological naturalism seem clearly misplaced. To assert that new discoveries
about the mechanisms of natural processes prove that supernatural causation or
direction does not exist, suffers from two main flaws. First, as suggested, it
ignores the ultimate "why" question with respect to natural mechanisms or
processes that have been uncovered and understood-why exactly do such
natural laws, order, or phenomena exist in the universe in the first place? This
seems at least as reasonably explainable by reference to an intelligent creator
and organizer as it is by reference to undirected and unknown material forces.
Second, of course, is that such an assertion assumes fallaciously that a "part
proves the whole"-because a certain physical phenomenon can be understood
and explained by reference to natural process or mechanism, this implies that
everything in the universe can. Most supernatural accounts of existence,
however, do not invoke supernatural action related to every natural process or
occurrence. Most posit such action at critical points in time, such as at the
creation of the universe itself, the creation of organic life on Earth, or the origin
of the human or other species, and then assume that natural processes and
204. See infra note 284 and accompanying text.
205. Obviously science can disprove claims of direct supernatural causation that might be
made as to certain physical events, such as when it discovers and explains how an allegedly
miraculous act occurred. And it can also support arguments that can be made against the
existence of a supernatural creator, such as when it demonstrates that certain human body parts,
for example, are not optimally designed for life on earth (if the claim is that an intelligent
creator would make everything perfectly). But what it cannot do is prove that a supernatural
creator is not ultimately responsible for our natural world, which is why many commentators
like Dawkins resort to arguments about what science has to say about the probability that such a
creator exists. However, at this point such claims become philosophic (or even religious) rather
than scientific, no matter how much effort is put into clothing them in the garb of the latter
discipline. See infra notes 283-90 and accompanying text; cf Karl Giberson, What's Wrong
with Science as Religion?, SALON.COM, July 31, 2008, http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/
2008/07/3 1/religion science/index.html (responding to criticisms of scientific materialists and
observing that "the suggestion that nothing can naturally fluctuate into everything sounds a lot
like a faith statement on a par with belief in God.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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mechanisms take their course in accordance with direction embedded in such
actions (including accounts that allow for random events and development to
occur within pre-ordained parameters).
In any event, at least as to issues of ultimate causation (or lack thereof), it
seems incoherent at best to use science in attempts to disprove the existence of
a supernatural supreme being when science itself rejects any acknowledgement
of supernatural action even in cases where empirical evidence might point in
such a direction. Just as troubling as this, however, is when science is
presented in a way to suggest an implicit rejection of religious accounts of
phenomena in cases where there is no prevailing scientific knowledge or
consensus about explanatory factors. As noted earlier, this may occur when
there is no explicit rejection of supernatural accounts, but they are effectively
rejected by omission when textbooks or teachings suggest or speculate solely
on natural causes for a given event. For example, suppose that a biology
textbook is introducing the subject of the origin of life on Earth, and it explains
that life may have or probably started with simple self-replicating molecules
that resulted from some form of chemical evolution which eventually evolved
into more complex organisms and plant life. Even if this explanation of events
were to be appropriately disclaimed as consisting of scientific speculation rather
than knowledge at this point in time, the impression it leaves on young students
is that organic life most likely arose through impersonal natural forces rather
than divine action. In other words, a materialist account of the origin of life on
Earth is essentially taught by default. As suggested earlier, in order to avoid
such a "metaphysical worldview trumping" on such a vital question, it is
essential that science textbooks and teachers be very clear about the speculative
nature of such claims and the intentional search for naturalistic explanations
that drives the scientific enterprise.
Despite all of these caveats about teaching the subject of evolution and
human origins in the science classroom, however, it clearly seems appropriate
to focus on conveying to students the modem neo-Darwinian account of natural
selection given its strong and broad support in the relevant scientific
communities as the best prevailing explanation of current empirical evidence
regarding the development (not origin) of life on Earth and the origin of human
and other species.2°7 The real question for present purposes is whether
206. Cf., e.g., COLLINS, supra note 20, at 199-201 (describing his belief that after
supernatural action created the universe and "[o]nce evolution got under way, no special
supernatural intervention was required.").
207. See, e.g., Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 743 (M.D. Pa.
2005) (discussing "unrebutted testimony that evolution, including common descent and natural
selection, is overwhelmingly accepted by the scientific community and that every major
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alternative creationist or intelligent design accounts of these phenomena, or
creationist or intelligent design critiques of the neo-Darwinian synthesis, can
also legitimately claim a place in the science classroom.
Certainly the creationist origins account first pushed in public schools,
which essentially incorporated a literal reading of Genesis, cannot be said to
represent a scientific theory or consist of scientific knowledge. °8 That account
essentially posits God's creation of our universe and world out of nothing
within a six-day period at some point during the last ten thousand years, and
God's later initiation of a catastrophic flood by which virtually all life on Earth
was destroyed and reestablished with chosen survivors from the human and
other animal species.20 9 Regardless of whether such an account is true or not,
causation by God cannot by definition constitute a scientific theory because it
posits supernatural causation to explain key events.210 Such causation is an
ultimate origins explanation that is simply outside the scope of scientific
investigation, and hence science has nothing to say in support of it or against
it.2 1' What science can investigate are the key facts asserted to underlie such an
account-the relatively young age of the Earth, a catastrophic flood, the descent
of the human race from Noahic ancestors, and the descent of animals from
certain pairs that survived the flood. But even if such facts were supported by
empirical evidence, the most science could say was that such events appear to
have occurred and that it took no stance on their ultimate causation (assuming
no naturalistic explanations for those events had been discovered).
However, the strong consensus of the scientific community based on its
assessment of relevant data is that our world and universe are much older than
ten thousand years, that life on Earth took much longer than six days to develop
and become established, and that the available evidence does not support the
occurrence of a world-wide catastrophic flood which "reset" life on this
scientific association agrees") (quotations omitted). The court further asserted, "'[E]volution is
more than a theory of origin in the context of science. To the contrary, evolution is the
dominant scientific theory of origin accepted by a majority of scientists."' Id. (quoting Selman
v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1309 (N.D. Ga. 2005), vacated, 449 F.3d
1320 (11th Cir. 2006)).
208. See, e.g., McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255,1266-72 (E.D. Ark. 1982)
(concluding that creation science, tied to a literal reading of Genesis, has no scientific merit);
see also GREENAWALT, supra note 25, at 107 ("Creation science in its full-blown, literal-Genesis
form lacks scientific support.").
209. See McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1260 n.7 (quoting the Creation Research Society, a
literal fundamentalist organization, membership statement of belief).
210. See, e.g., id. at 1267 (stating that the creationist theory of origins, as "a concept[,] is
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planet.212 Indeed, it is difficult to assert that such claims enjoy even a relatively
weak amount of consensus as mere speculation of parts of the science
community, even when they may not contradict directly the available evidence
supporting evolutionary theory. Thus, one must conclude, as have most courts,
that the presentation of such an account in a science course, even if God were
left out of the picture, would be an inappropriate attempt to introduce religious
beliefs in that setting.213
Obviously this conclusion would be different if sufficient empirical
evidence existed to support the presentation of the creationist account as a
scientifically plausible, alternative explanation of the origin and development of
life on Earth.214 This is precisely what past and current proponents of"creation
science" claim is the case. In 1982, however, a federal district court, in
McLean v. Arkansas, carefully examined such contentions and rejected them.215
It explained that virtually all of the alleged scientific evidence put forth by
creation science proponents actually consisted of claims criticizing evolutionary
theory rather than supporting creationist theory.216 The court correctly pointed
out that such a "scientific" case for the latter theory contained a major fallacy:
It implicitly assumed a false, bifurcated model of a non-created, evolved
universe, on the one hand, or a universe created by God in the Genesis manner
on the other.217 In other words, the assumption was that evidence purportedly
212. See, e.g., IsAAK, supra note 194, at 217, 231-42 (approximating Earth's age at 4.5
billion years and countering various creationist justifications and arguments that defend the
flood).
213. Unless, of course, the scope of a science class was defined broadly enough to allow
discussion of religious ideas touching on covered topics, as has been proposed in England. See,
e.g., Tony Halpin, Creationism to Be Taught on GCSE Syllabus, TIMES (London), Mar. 10,
2006, at 12 (reporting on the incorporation of creationism to the syllabus by an examinations
board "to make students aware of scientific controversy"). But such attempts have been
opposed in the United States because of a history of trying to present such ideas as alternative
scientific truth. See, e.g., supra notes 99-106, 133-46 and accompanying text (describing some
of the most notable judicial decisions concerning the presentation of religious ideas as science
in public schools).
214. Assuming, again, that ultimate supernatural causation was left out of that account.
215. See McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1272 (E.D. Ark. 1982)
(invalidating creation science law as having the purpose and effect of advancing religion and
explicitly determining that creation science was not legitimate science).
216. Id. at 1270 ("The proof in support of creation science consisted almost entirely of
efforts to discredit the theory of evolution through a rehash of data and theories which have
been before the scientific community for decades."). The court added, "The arguments asserted
by creationists are not based upon new scientific evidence or laboratory data which has been
ignored by the scientific community." Id.
217. See id. at 1266 ("The two model approach of the creationists is simply a contrived
dualism which has no scientific factual basis or legitimate educational purpose.").
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undermining evolutionary theory would necessarily support the Genesis
account.21 8 This is plainly incorrect, given the myriad number of other possible
origins scenarios not discounted by legitimate scientifically-supported critiques
of standard evolutionary theory-not the least of which would include a non-
created, evolutionary model not captured accurately by existing theory, a
universe created by God through evolutionary processes not captured accurately
by existing theory, or a universe created by God through processes other than
evolution but different than those described in Genesis.
This logical fallacy in the creationist scientists' "proof' of their origins
account fatally undermined its validity, notwithstanding the problem of whether
such critiques of evolutionary theory truly undermined it to such an extent that
it would prove an alternative origins account to be true, even if one assumed,
arguendo, that only two different versions were possible. But the two main
types of evidence put forth by that group did not even satisfy the latter
proposition. As to the first type, it was argued, and the court actually found,
that the creation scientists "established that the mathematical probability of a
chance chemical combination resulting in life from non-life is so remote that
such an occurrence is almost beyond imagination. 2 19 While finding such
"statistical figures... [to] be impressive evidence against the theory of chance
chemical combinations as an explanation of origins,, 220 the court pointed to the
"dual-model" fallacy in using such evidence as proof of the Genesis account of
creation.22' Moreover, as the court failed to note but had pointed out earlier in
its opinion, while "the subject of origins of life is within the province of
biology, the scientific community does not consider origins of life a part of
evolutionary theory. The theory of evolution "assumes the existence of life"
218. See id. ("Application of these two models, according to creationists... dictates that
all scientific evidence which fails to support the theory of evolution is necessarily scientific
evidence in support of creationism and is, therefore, creation science 'evidence' in support of
[the statute] .... ).
219. Id. at 1269.
220. Id.
221. See id. at 1269-70 (highlighting the testimony of the defense's expert witness, Dr.
Wickramasinghe, in order to show the fallacy of thinking that evidence criticizing evolution was
proof of creation). Dr. Wickramasinghe testified on his "theory that life on earth was 'seeded' by
comets which delivered genetic material[s] and perhaps [living] organisms" to Earth from
somewhere else in space. Id. at 1269. This theory certainly did not dispose of the question of
life's origin in the universe; it merely attempted to explain life's presence on Earth. Id
However, it did serve as an illustration of how the "dual model" fallacy failed to account for
other possibilities besides evolution and creationism. See id. at 1269-70 ("[Dr.
Wickramasinghe] demonstrated that the simplistic approach of the two model analysis of the
origins of life is false.").
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and is directed to an explanation of how life evolved. ''222 In other words, the
initial appearance of life on Earth is not within the claims of evolutionary
theory much less the subject of any other established scientific theory-the
former assumes the existence of life and proceeds to explain how it evolved and
223developed into new species after the appearance of the first living organisms.
In short, standard evolutionary theory is agnostic on the question of whether the
complex biochemical processes we call "life" were the product of a divine
spark or undirected material forces.224 Accordingly, probabilistic evidence as to
the initial appearance of life-even putting aside its "logical" (mathematical)
versus "empirical" nature-was simply not a valid critique of evolutionary
theory even if it was persuasive evidence against the notion of life appearing by
chance in the first place.
The second type of evidence presented by the creation scientists concerned
the age of the Earth.225 They presented a recent discovery of "radioactive
polonium haloes in granite and coalified woods, 226 that were thought to be
inconsistent with techniques used by scientists to date the creation of fossils and
other materials at millions of years in the past. Thus, it was argued, such
evidence supported the 6,000-10,000 year age of the Earth derived from
Genesis rather than the much older time span assumed by evolutionary
227theory. On its merits, the court found this critique of scientific dating
techniques to be weak, concluding that the scientific community viewed such a
discovery "as a minor mystery which will eventually be explained. 228 Indeed,
several plausible scientific explanations have since been offered to resolve the
apparent inconsistencies between the haloes phenomenon and the ancient age
of the materials in which they appear.229 Once again, however, even a valid
critique of such dating techniques would obviously not serve to validate an
estimated age of the Earth derived from Genesis. Not only would alternative
222. Id. at 1266.
223. Id.
224. See id. ("Evolution does not presuppose the absence of a creator or God .....
225. See id. at 1270 (dismissing creationists' alleged proof of "a 'relatively recent
inception' of the earth and a 'worldwide flood'").
226. Id.
227. The court also took note of other evidence questioning the validity of radioactive
dating techniques used by scientists to estimate ages of fossils and other materials. Id. at 1272.
228. Id.
229. See, e.g., Thomas A. Baillieul, Polonium Haloes Refuted: A Review of"Radioactive
Haloes in a Radio-Chronological and Cosmological Perspective" by Robert V. Gentry, TALK
ORIGiNs, http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/po-halos/gentry.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2008)
(criticizing the scientific method of Gentry's experiment and characterizing his results as
inconclusive at best) (on file with the Washington & Lee Law Review).
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scientific dating techniques establishing a very ancient age of the Earth also
need to be persuasively undermined, but affirmative and convincing evidence
of a "young Earth" would also need to be presented-something the creation
scientists failed to do.230  And although such an examination of creation
scientist claims was undertaken by the McLean court over two decades ago, it
does not appear the empirical evidence put forth by that group to critique neo-
Darwinian theory or support the Genesis account of creation has become any
stronger in the intervening period.23'
Turning now to the legitimacy of intelligent design as science, that theory
asserts that certain features of the universe and life are best explained as the
product of conscious design rather than undirected or random processes such as
natural selection.232 As noted earlier, two main arguments have typically been
made to support this claim: Behe's argument about "irreducible complexity"
233
and Dembski's argument based on the notion of "complex specified
information."234 ID proponents claim that both of these concepts amount to
scientific theories because they are based on conclusions drawn from the
observation and critical analysis of empirically-derived information.
Considering Behe's work first, his data gathering and analysis essentially
consists of observations and judgments that certain features of an organism, like
a bacteria's flagellum used for locomotion or a human body's blood-clotting
system, appear to exhibit irreducible complexity in their system components.235
Indeed, ID proponents suggest that irreducible complexity can be empirically
230. See McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp 1255, 1270 (E.D. Ark. 1982)
(highlighting that even defense expert witnesses expressed a view, contrary to the "haloes"
theory, that "no rational scientist" would believe that the earth was less than one million years
old or that its current geology could have been created by a worldwide flood).
231. See ISAAK, supra note 194, at 216-45 (summarizing creationist arguments for a
"young Earth" and presenting some of the scientific evidence contradicting each of these
claims); see also TalkOrigins Archive, http://www.talkorigins.org (last visited Nov. 1, 2008)
(indexing lists of creationist claims and evolutionary counterevidence) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Law Review).
232. See supra Part II.C (describing intelligent design theory).
233. See supra Part II.C (discussing Behe's theory of"irreducible complexity" in greater
detail).
234. Id. However, in his more recent writings, Dembski appears to have incorporated
Behe's notion of irreducible complexity as a subset of his own argument based on specified
complexity. See DEMBSKI & WELLS, supra note 126, at 149 (summarizing what Dembski means
by his term "specified complexity"). He finds that the biochemical systems that Behe identifies
meet the criteria of being both complex and specified, hence meeting his test for being a product
of design. Id.
235. See generally BEHE, supra note 117 (presenting examples of irreducibly complex
biochemical systems that Behe claims are not adequately explained by the theory of natural
selection).
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tested and verified: Simply remove one of these systems' components and see
whether the systems still perform their original functions.236 If not, they have
been proven to be irreducibly complex and unattainable by means of natural
selection since such a system could not have evolved directly as long as there is
no apparent lesser degree of original function associated with the more simply
composed systems (and hence nothing to select for at that earlier stage of
development).237 And once that has been established, the reasoning goes,
intelligent creation and design for such systems become a better explanation for
their origin than natural selection.238
Now whether and to what extent an argument or theory is considered
scientific depends, as discussed earlier, on its support in empirical observations,
experiments, or measurements that can produce objective, replicable findings,
and the extent to which those findings are actually verified by the relevant
scientific communities and result in some degree of consensus on the
conclusions drawn from them.239 While it might be said that studying
biochemical or other natural systems for signs of irreducible complexity is an
empirical process because it involves visual observations and assessments
based upon them-and even might be testable to some extent by showing that
the loss of a component results in the loss of a system's function (although no
empirical demonstration of an irreducibly complex system seems to have
successfully been made to date)24° -it is difficult to say that such a process
results in objective findings that would be replicable by others. This is because
an assessment of irreducible complexity is not a measurement or other
objectively quantifiable data point, but rather a speculative and subjective
236. See, e.g., DEMBSKI &WELLS, supra note 126, at 148 (asserting that a determination of
"whether a system is irreducibly complex.., requires an analysis of the system, and specifically
of those parts whose removal renders the basic function unrecoverable"). "This analysis needs
to demonstrate that no system with (substantially) fewer parts exhibits the basic function ....
Consequently, these parts belong to the irreducible core, a fact that receives empirical
confirmation by removing the parts experimentally and showing that the basic function is
unrecoverable from the remaining parts." Id. at 148-49.
237. However, Dembski concedes that not all parts are necessary, only those that make up
a part of what he calls the "irreducible core." Id.
238. See id. at 156 (determining that Darwinian mechanisms of natural selection are of no
help in explaining how some traits are selected for their future function).
239. See supra notes 180-90 and accompanying text (discussing the generally accepted
scientific process).
240. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 740-41 (M.D. Pa.
2005) (citing peer reviewed studies that appear to negate evidence of irreducible complexity);
see also MILLER, supra note 110, at 70-74 (criticizing ID's failure to prove irreducible
complexity); BARBARA FORREST & PAUL R. GROSS, CREATIONISM'S TROJAN HORSE: THE WEDGE
OF INTEL11GENT DESIGN 66-84 (2004) (discussing lack of scientific support for the concept of
irreducible complexity).
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judgment that a precursor system could not have functioned at a less optimal
level within the earlier and likely different environment that it would have been
operating in.24' In other words, the very most one could establish from such an
empirical process is that a precursor system appeared to have had no previous
242useful function. It seems clear that such a "finding" would be more in the
nature of an opinion than a replicable event or data point-it would only be
replicable to the extent a fellow scientist was to agree with that subjective
judgment.243
And even if scientists were inclined to agree with such an assessment, it
would most likely be subject to a critical qualifier-i.e., that basedon the state
of existing evidence and knowledge, no prior useful function appeared to be
known.244 Hence, most scientists would consider any such assessment to be
speculative because evidence of a component's prior useful function could
always be discovered at a later point in time. To assert, then, that the theory of
irreducible complexity is based on objective data that can be verified and
confirmed by other members of the scientific community seems inaccurate.
Moreover, even if a finding of irreducible complexity could be established
objectively and was verifiable, it seems unlikely that any sort of scientific
consensus would ever emerge that such a condition was the result of conscious
design as opposed to natural processes. As other commentators have observed,
an inference that an irreducibly complex system must have been designed as is
because the process of natural selection could not have produced it embodies
the same false dichotomy embodied in the arguments of creation scientists:
Either natural selection produced it or it was the product of intelligent design.245
241. See Keith Robison, Darwin's Black Box: Irreducible Complexity or Irreproducible
Irreducibility?, TALKORIGINS, http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/behe/review.html (last visited
Nov. 8, 2008) ("A system is labeled 'irreducibly complex' if he [Behe] cannot postulate a
workable simpler form for the system. There is no way to prove such a claim.") (on file with the
Washington & Lee Law Review), see also MASSIMO PIGLIUCCI, DENYING EvoLuTIoN:
CREATIONISM, SCIENTISM, AND THE NATURE OF SCIENCE 67 (2002) (characterizing irreducible
complexity as a negative theory, that only predicts what cannot happen, and therefore cannot be
scientifically proven).
242. Cf. PIGLIUCCI, supra note 241, at 67 ("Behe has provided no backing for his claim that
irreducibly complex biological structures exist, other than to say that he cannot think of how
they could be possible through natural selection.").
243. This is a judgment that, in any event, most scientists would not be comfortable making
given its unsupported and speculative nature. See supra note 240 and accompanying text
(discussing lack of empirical demonstrations of irreducible complexity).
244. See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 739 (observing that such a qualification on the
theory renders it meaningless as a criticism of evolutionary theories that have well-documented
support for how multi-structured systems could have evolved through natural means).
245. See id. at 735 ("[T]he argument of irreducible complexity, central to ID, employs the
same flawed and illogical contrived dualism that doomed creation science in the 1980's.").
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As discussed earlier, a refutation of natural selection would not prove the
latter.246 There are myriad alternative accounts that could conceivably explain
an irreducibly complex system, such as an incomplete understanding of how
natural selection works or the existence of an alternative evolutionary process
that has yet to be discovered.247 Indeed, as noted by the court in the Kitzmiller
case, there appears to be an emerging scientific consensus that natural selection
can operate through indirect Darwinian pathways such that precursor systems
are selected on the basis of performing different functions than they do in a
current system, a process referred to as "exaptation. 248  Obviously, such
findings present a huge stumbling block for the concept of irreducible
complexity which is only an argument against direct natural selection
pathways.
249
Lastly, although ID proponents do not officially take the position that God
is the intelligent designer of irreducibly complex systems-asserting that space
aliens could have been the designer25° -the lack of evidence for the latter
246. Supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
247. Cf MILLER, supra note 110, at 57-58 (citing the example of discovery of the
mechanism by which the human body developed left-right asymmetry to show that it is incorrect
to assume, simply because the origin of a scientific mechanism has not been discovered yet, that
the mechanism came about by non-natural means).
248. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 739 (M.D. Pa. 2005)
(citing exaptation as a "well-documented explanation" which contradicts Behe's hypothesis of
irreducible complexity); see also MICHAEL SHERMER, WHY DARWIN MATTERS: THE CASE
AGAINST INTELLIGENT DESIGN 68-71 (2006) (explaining exaptation as a phenomenon "in which
a feature that originally evolved for one purpose is co-opted for a different purpose"). Shermer
uses exaptation to refute Behe's criticisms of such complex designs as the blood clotting system
and wing development in animals. Id. He also notes that Behe's irreducible complexity
criticism is similar to the problem of incipient stages that Darwin himself identified in the
nineteenth century, and that Darwin's answer to this criticism supported the theory now known
as exaptation:
Although an organ may not have been originally formed for some special purpose,
if it now serves for this end we are justified in saying that it is specially contrived
for it .... [T]hroughout nature almost every part of each living being has probably
served, in a slightly modified condition, for diverse purposes, and has acted in the
living machinery of many ancient and distinct specific forms.
Id. (quoting DARwIN, ON THE VARIOUS CONTRIVANCES BY WHICH BRITISH AND FOREIGN
ORCHIDS ARE FERTILIZED BY INSECTS, AND ON THE GOOD EFFECTS OF INTERCROSSING 328
(1862)).
249. See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 739 (quoting Professor Behe's statement that "[an
irreducibly complex system cannot be produced directly by slight, successive modifications of a
precursor system, because any precursor to an irreducibly complex system that is missing a part
is by definition nonfunctional") (emphasis added).
250. See BEHE, supra note 117, at 248-49 (discussing the possibility articulated by Sir
Francis Crick, one of the discoverers of the DNA double-helix structure, that life on earth began
when intelligent alien life forms sent rocket ships containing spores to seed the earth).
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explanation would probably lead most scientists to conclude that an inference
of intelligent design was a thinly-veiled assertion of supernatural causation that
violates the principle of methodological naturalism. 251 Indeed, this was one of
the main reasons why the Kitzmiller court concluded that intelligent design, and
in particular the concept of irreducible complexity, was not a scientific
theory.252 For all of these reasons, it seems clear that the concept of irreducible
complexity does not amount to a scientific theory as the enterprise of science is
understood and defined today. 53
William Dembski's idea of"complex specified information" (CSI) seems
equally problematic from the perspective of presenting a valid scientific theory
based on empirically objective and testable information. As noted earlier,
Dembski's arguments are steeped in information and probability theory, and he
purports to prove their validity using complex mathematical and probability
254formulae. As such, his arguments rely primarily on the logical rather than
empirical sciences, and are difficult for a non-mathematician or non-statistician
to follow. In reviewing his work and the reviews of qualified critics,
255
however, Dembski appears to ask two basic questions in structuring his
argument for intelligent design. First, does a natural object, such as one of
Behe's irreducibly complex systems which Dembski uses as an example of an
object exhibiting CSI, contain information sequences that are highly
251. Cf, e.g., Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 735-38 (quoting defense witness's expert
testimony that ID posits only a supernatural entity could have designed the various forms of life
found on earth). Dr. Millich acknowledged that in order to recognize intelligent design as
science, the rules of science would have to be expanded to accept the possibility of supernatural
forces. Id.
252. Id.; see supra notes 240-49 and accompanying text for the other main reasons that the
court found irreducible complexity to be a nonscientific theory.
253. For a recent and very comprehensive critique of Behe's theories, including an updated
explication of them which Behe recently published in a new book, see MILLER, supra note 110,
at 28-36, 53-74.
254. See supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text (describing the theory of specified
complexity).
255. See, e.g., Tainer Edis, Chance and Necessity-and Intelligent Design?, in WHY
INTELLIGENT DESIGN FAILS: A SCIENTIFIC CRITIQUE OF THE NEW CREATIONISM 139, 139-52
(Matt Young & Taner Edis eds., 2006); Wesley R. Elsberry, Logic andMath Turn to Smoke and
Mirrors: William Dembski's "Design Inference," in SCIENTISTS CONFRONT CREATIONISM:
INTELLIGENT DESIGN AND BEYOND 250, 250-71 (Andrew J. Petto & Laurie R. Godfrey eds.,
2007); FORREST & GROSS, supra note 240, at 114-46; Mark Perakh, There Is a Free Lunch After
All: William Dembski 's Wrong Answers to Irrelevant Questions, in WHY INTELLIGENT DESIGN
FAILS: A SCIENTIFIC CRrnQUE OF THE NEW CREATIONISM 153, 153-71; PIGLIUCCI, supra note
241, at 59-64; Jeffrey Shallit & Wesley Elsberry, Playing Games with Probability: Dembski's
Complex SpecifiedInformation, in WHY INTELLIGENT DESIGN FAILS: A SCIENTIFIC CRITIQUE OF
THENEW CREATIONISM 121,121-38; NIALL SHANKS, GOD, THE DEvIL, AND DARWIN: A CRITIQUE
OF INTELLIGENT DESIGN THEORY 123-34, 171-76 (2004).
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improbable (i.e., not easily reproducible by chance)? If so, then the object
exhibits complexity.256 Second, do such sequences contain relatively concise
patterns of information such that they are likely to have been produced
independently of the natural process that gave rise to the object and its
information content? If so, then the object exhibits CSI most likely caused by
conscious or intelligent direction rather than resulting from chance or the
257operation of natural laws or processes. At its essence, Dembski's concept of
CSI appears to be a statistically sophisticated argument that complex designs of
natural objects, such as Behe's irreducibly complex systems, are highly unlikely
to be the result of random events or undirected but regular natural processes-
that is, they are highly improbable events absent recourse to an explanation of
intelligent design.258
While Dembski's arguments are far too technical to be evaluated fairly by
someone not educated in mathematics, information theory or related disciplines,
the numerous critiques of his work by those qualified to make such judgments
seem to voice two main complaints about their scientific validity. The first is
that Dembski's arguments are too abstract and theoretical in nature, relying
heavily on subjective judgments that are skewed towards finding intelligent
259action in the universe. More specifically, the criticism appears to go,
judgments about the complexity of information sequences, or the nature and
source of information patterns, are so wide open that one can engineer them to
support almost any desired conclusion. 260  The implication here is that
Dembski's analysis, like Behe's irreducible complexity arguments, fails to
contain the sort of objective and verifiable information that scientific theories
are made of.
The second major complaint has to do with Dembski's premise that any
design purportedly found in nature must come from an intelligent actor.26'
256. DEMBSKI & WELLS, supra note 126, at 165 ("An object, event, or structure exhibits
specified complexity if it is both complex (i.e., not easily reproducible by chance) and specified
(i.e., displays an independently given pattern)."); id. at 168 ("The 'complexity' in 'specified
complexity' refers to improbability.").
257. See supra note 256; id. at 169, 172-75 (setting out the requirements that in order to
exhibit specified complexity, a system must have low descriptive complexity-have a pattern or
structure that is relatively simple to describe-but have a small probability of occurring by
chance).
258. See id. at 160 ("It's not just that certain biological systems are so complex that we
can't imagine how they evolved by Darwinian pathways. Rather, we can show conclusively that
direct Darwinian pathways are causally inadequate to bring them about .... ).
259. See, e.g., Shallit & Elsberry, supra note 255, at 121, 130-32 (criticizing Dembski's
"pseudomathematical" arguments as being calculated to reach the desired results).
260. Id.
261. See, e.g., FORREST & GRoss, supra note 240, at 121 (criticizing Dembski's premise
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Dembski appears to split the world into three main categories: Things that
occur or arise 1) by necessity through the operation of"regular" natural laws or
processes, 2) by chance or at random via the operation of undirected natural
processes, or 3) by the actions of an intelligent designer.262 Thus, if one can
rule out the first two options as the cause of something (as Dembski frequently
claims to do through his calculations), then one has proven the third to be true
263through the process of elimination. But, the critics contend, there is also a
fourth category that Dembski ignores and that is devastating for his theory:
Self-organizing things exhibiting patterns or design that are produced through
non-regular natural processes, such as certain meteorological phenomena or
even natural selection itself.264 Thus, what appears to be design in nature can in
fact be produced by non-intelligent forces. This fact, it is contended,
invalidates Dembski's entire "process of elimination" logic.
265
Although Dembski does have a few supporters in the ranks of those
qualified to assess his work, it seems clear that he has far more detractors in
that group.266 Accordingly, even if it could be said that Dembski's arguments
were based on objective and empirically testable data-which does not appear
to be the case-his theory certainly does not have the sort of verification and
scientific consensus that would qualify it for presentation in a science
classroom as a valid scientific theory.267
"that supernatural agency is the only acceptable answer to the question of the source of the
world's creation and order").
262. See id. at 122-25 (summarizing Dembski's categorization of natural phenomenon);
PIGLIUCCI, supra note 241, at 59 (asserting that Dembski "claims that there are three essential
types of phenomena in nature: 'regular,' random, and designed (the last of which he assumes
without further discussion to be products of intelligence).").
263. See FORREST & GROSS, supra note 240, at 124 (observing that Dembski's "explanatory
filter is an algorithmic method of logical inference, by which it is claimed we can reliably
discover design, anywhere in the physical world, without false positives, by a process of
elimination").
264. See PIGLIUCCI,supra note 241, at 59-64 (discussing organization or design in natural
phenomena resulting from non-intelligent processes); Miller, supra note 110, at 74-85 (same);
cf Mark Perakh, The Dream World of William Dembski's Creationism, TALK REASON, Aug. 19,
2005, http://www.talkreason.org/articles/Skeptic paper.cfm (last visited Nov. 2, 2008)
(discussing the rare occurrence of triangular snowflakes as a natural phenomenon that occurs
under very rare circumstances) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). These rare
triangular snowflakes have a simpler design than normal snowflakes and could arguably cause
false positive results when analyzed according to Dembski's mathematical formula for
determining whether a phenomenon is the product of intelligent design. Id.
265. See PIGLIUCCI, supra note 241, at 59-64.
266. See supra note 255 (cataloging several of Dembski's strongest critics).
267. For a recent and comprehensive critique of Dembski's theories from a prominent
biologist's perspective, see MILLER, supra note 110, at 36-40, 74-85.
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This brings us to the current strategy of ID proponents, who tellingly are
not pushing at the present time for their claims to be taught directly as a theory
of biological origins. Rather, as noted earlier, they currently advocate a strategy
of "teaching the controversy" in science classrooms: Essentially urging science
teachers to present Behe's, Dembski's, and certain other arguments as critiques
of, and alternatives to, the neo-Darwinian account, and mainly the theory of
natural selection.268 However, just as a theory being taught as science in a
science class must enjoy a substantial degree of scientific consensus to qualify
for such treatment, it follows that a purported scientific controversy about such
a theory should also be supported by some degree of scientific consensus on the
criticism before it is also entitled to be taught as part of the relevant science.
Just what that level of critical consensus should be is difficult to say,269 but it
seems fair to say that it must, at the least, be significant and meaningful. And
to create such a consensus, just as with the original theory, there would need to
be empirically objective and verifiable data supporting the criticism.
270
Keeping these considerations in mind, it seems clear that ID proponents
have not met their burden of showing that there is a genuine scientific
controversy about prevailing evolutionary theory that would warrant the
presentation of ID theories or critiques in the science classroom. As discussed
above, the extent to which Behe's and Dembski's theories are based on
objective and testable empirical data is highly questionable, and even if they
268. For instance, in June of 2006, just six months after the Kitzmiller decision, the
Discovery Institute produced a video entitled, How To TEACH THE CONTROVERSY LEGALLY
(Discovery Institute 2006), available at http://www.discovery.org/a/2111 (last visited Nov. 2,
2008) (on file with the Washington & Lee Law Review). The Discovery Institute website touts
the video as "[a] great resource for teachers, school board members, and parents, this video
features interviews with scientists and legal scholars and explains how to teach the controversy
over evolution in a legally responsible manner." Center for Science and Culture, How to Teach
the Controversy Legally, http://www.discovery.org/a/2111 (last visited Nov. 2, 2008) (on file
with the Washington & Lee Law Review). See also Discovery Institute Guide for Teachers, at
8, http://www.discovery.org/a/4299 (containing criticisms of evolutionary theory made by ID
proponents in addition to those based on Behe's and Dembski's arguments); id. at 13 (asserting
that "[allthough Discovery Institute does not advocate requiring the teaching of intelligent
design in public schools, it does believe there is nothing unconstitutional about voluntarily
discussing the scientific theory of design in the classroom. In addition, the Institute opposes
efforts to persecute individual teachers who may wish to discuss the scientific debate over
design in an objective and pedagogically appropriate manner.").
269. See generally CTR. FOR SCI., MATHEMATICS, & ENG'G EDUC., NATIONAL SCIENCE
EDUCATION STANDARDS (National Academic Press 1996), available at
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record id=4962&page=103 (last visited Nov. 1, 2008)
(discussing content of national science education standards) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Law Review).
270. Cf. McDonald, supra note 180, at 987-88 (describing the methods used to establish
"scientific" knowledge).
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were, there is hardly a scientific consensus-much less a significant and
meaningful one-that they constitute valid scientific theories. 27' And this is
true regardless of whether those theories are presented as criticisms of
evolutionary theory and natural selection, or are presented as affirmative
evidence of intelligent design in the universe.272 Moreover, even if their
271. See, e.g., Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 745 (M.D. Pa.
2005) (refusing to accept ID as a valid scientific theory because of its failure to follow the
science community's recognized processes of establishing consensus to support a new theory).
See also generally Matthew J. Brauer, et al., Is it Science Yet?: Intelligent Design Creationism
and the Constitution, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (2005) (arguing that ID is not science and
persuasively critiquing arguments of ID proponents that it is and could constitutionally be
taught as such in the public schools). Cf Wexler, supra note 24, at 799-834 (arguing that
courts would consider ID to be a religious theory that could legally be taught objectively for
informational purposes, but questioning the wisdom of such an approach particularly as to
including such a subject in the science curriculum).
272. Kent Greenawalt makes a cogent and powerful argument that intelligent design
theories are best understood as being theories about the limits of science in this area, and
particularly about the current inadequacy of the theory of natural selection to fully explain
biological systems that appear rather complex and ordered. See GREENAWALT, supra note 25, at
108-15. As such, he suggests that intelligent design might properly and legally be discussed in
science classes as one conceivable alternative explanation for such complexity and order where
evidence regarding natural selection is insufficient to support it. See id at 108-25. He explains
that where "scientific evidence may suggest that no natural explanation suffices for physical
events... [and] convincing evidence of such [explanatory] limits lay within science itself, their
analysis would appropriately fall within the scope of science courses." Id. at 113. In other
words, Greenawalt appears to be arguing that where evidence is strong that natural selection
cannot sufficiently explain the apparent irreducible complexity of some organisms, then a
discussion of the latter concept and possible explanations for it (i.e., intelligent design) is fair
game as a scientific topic. Putting aside the fact that many scientists would likely dispute the
notion that current evidence for natural selection cannot adequately explain apparent irreducible
complexity, and assuming there was a scientific consensus for this position, in offering
intelligent design as one possible explanation for it Greenawalt seems to be taking basic issue
with science's "ground rule" of methodological naturalism (limiting scientific explanations to
naturalistic ones). Indeed, he seems to concede this point. See id. at 113-14. In a recent and
intriguing article, philosopher Thomas Nagel (a professed atheist) appears to make similar
arguments, see generally Thomas Nagel, Public Education and Intelligent Design, 36 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 187 (2008), and particularly takes issue with the principle of methodological
naturalism to the point of being dismissive about its legitimacy. See id. at 196 n.7. Greenawalt
and Nagel may be absolutely right to question the soundness of a rule that treats supernatural
explanations as being inherently out of bounds even where empirical evidence points strongly to
the implausibility of natural explanations. At bottom, however, these appear to be arguments
that the current definition and accepted understanding of science does not make sense and
should change, despite the instrumentalist rationale that is put forth to defend methodological
naturalism. And one way of addressing this may be to convince state education boards that they
are right, thus pitting those bodies against the general scientific community and creating even
more controversy in this area. Another approach may be to follow the route I suggest in this
Article, allowing that community to set the ground rules of its discipline, but exposing students
learning about it to potential supernatural explanations of "difficult to explain" natural
phenomena as matters of traditional philosophical analysis in a class designed for such
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theories could be regarded as legitimately scientific, it is far from clear that they
even create a controversy regarding prevailing evolutionary theory. As noted
earlier, science has shown that design in nature can result from natural forces
(creating a problem for Dembski's theory),2 73 and is showing that natural
selection can proceed via indirect pathways of evolution (creating a problem for
Behe's theory).274
In sum, it appears that much more would be required of creationist and ID
theories of origins before they could appropriately be taught in the biology
classroom.275 But does this mean that the concepts of creation and purposeful
design, and supporting arguments that may be drawn from the creationist and
ID camps, among other sources, have no place in American public education?
It should be clear from what I have said that legitimate science does not
officially take a position on the "nature of origins" issue, one way or another. It
is simply trying to explain the way our world works as we see it, and not the
question of why it ultimately works in the way it does. However, in an area like
evolutionary biology, where biology class is typically the only course middle or
high school students will take that deals with the subject of life or human
origins, such a sterile scientific account is inadequate to prepare American
youths to answer such important questions for themselves. Either they will not
grasp the subtleties of the limited nature of the scientific endeavor, or, whether
they do or not, they will come away from their public education with the
impression that religion has little to say on these issues. Hence, it seems likely
that, in the main, one of two things will result: Either students will take away a
materialistic account of origins by default, or the more religiously-involved
students will reject everything they learned about evolutionary biology as
being in conflict with their faith. Either way, science, religion, students,
and our society all end up the poorer in this situation.
purposes. See infra Part III.C.
273. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 248 and accompanying text (describing theory of exaptation).
275. Perhaps the strongest indictment of ID as science comes from the recognized founder
of the modem ID movement, Philip Johnson, who made these candid and surprising remarks in
a recent interview:
"I ... don't think that there is really a theory of intelligent design at the present
time to propose as a comparable alternative to the Darwinian theory, which is,
whatever error it might contain, a fully worked out scheme. There is no intelligent
design theory that's comparable. Working out a positive theory is the job of the
scientific people that we have affiliated with the movement. Some of them are
quite convinced that it's doable, but that's for them to prove .... No product is
ready for competition in the educational world."
Michelangelo D'Agostino, In the Matter of Berkeley v. Berkeley, BERKELEY Sci. REv. 31, 33
(Spring 2006).
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What, then, is the answer to this undesirable state of affairs? Is there
an appropriate class to further examine the limited scope of the scientific
endeavor, and to engage students in a broader discussion of theistic and
materialistic perspectives on the origins of ourselves, life, and the universe?
It is my argument that a basic philosophy course on the subject, geared to
upper-level high school students, is the optimal solution. In the next
section, I explain why such a philosophy of origins course would be the
ideal venue.
C. A Basic Philosophy of Origins Course To Bridge the Science-
Religion Divide
In contrast to science, which is a discipline that seeks to discover and
explain the workings of the natural world via an emphasis on empirical
evidence and an objective, rigorous analysis of it, philosophy is a discipline
with a broader scope and methods of inquiry. As one dictionary puts it,
philosophy investigates "the nature, causes, or principles of reality,
knowledge, or values, based on logical reasoning rather than empirical
methods., 276 Thus, not only is philosophy's scope of inquiry broader than
science, investigating the nature of "reality" versus the natural world alone,
its methods of inquiry are broader as well. 277 Although both disciplines
rely on the use of logical reasoning in conducting their inquiries, science
places a much higher degree of importance on empirical evidence as the
basis for its claims. While "hard" data derived from human observation
and other sensory faculties certainly informs philosophical inquiry, the
main grist for its mill tends to be "common human experience, 278 and basic
276. TE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1318 (4th ed.
2000).
277. Cf, e.g., MORTIMER J. ADLER, THE FOUR DIMENSIONS OF PHILOSOPHY 810-11 (1993).
Adler states:
Philosophy, like science and history, and unlike mathematics, is empirical, not
formal, differing in the character of the experience it uses and relies upon. But it is
also like mathematics, and unlike science and history, in being an armchair, or
noninvestigative mode of inquiry by virtue of the fact that the experience it uses
and upon which it relies is the common core of experience that all human beings
have when they are awake and are exercising their senses ....
Id.
278. Id. at 53 ("One should not expect in philosophy anything like the progress that has
occurred in the history of science, in view of the fact that philosophy is noninvestigative, has its
empirical base in common human experience, and is continuous with common sense.").
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"common sense." 279 Accordingly, logic and common experience serve as the
philosopher's main tools of the trade in investigating various aspects of
reality.80
It seems clear, then, that philosophy is the intellectual discipline that
should be employed to handle the materialism-theism debate in the origins
context. The existence or non-existence of a supernatural creator, and "its"
relationship to our world, have long been central subjects of inquiry in the
philosophical tradition.281 This is because not only is it difficult to think of
questions more central to our existence-and philosophy has long occupied
itself with deliberating on questions of an "ultimate" nature-but also because
philosophy is uniquely situated to explore them. Not only do such questions
involve an examination of natural world phenomena, such as the extent to
which the structure and happenings of that world support or undermine the
argument for a supernatural creator's existence,282 but just as importantly they
concern an examination of human experience with claimed supernatural
phenomena-such as claimed moral or spiritual leadings through the medium
of human consciousness. All of these claims fall easily within philosophy's
provenance, being concerned as it is with the entire variety of human
experience and the logical inferences and conclusions that can be drawn from
it. Science, on the other hand, is uniquely unsuited to exploring these
questions, being deaf as it is to any phenomena that cannot be physically
observed, measured, tested, or otherwise interrogated on a material level. And
its commitment to methodological naturalism simply prevents it from asking to
what extent natural phenomena might support or detract from the case for
supernatural beings or planes of reality.
Indeed, as to the origins debate, and as between science and philosophy, at
least two of the "Big 3" origins questions-how the universe itself and life on
Earth arose (how species and humans originated obviously being the third)--
must largely be the subject of philosophical discussion because the current
science regarding them is simply too speculative or incomplete to say much that
279. Id.
280. Cf id. at 58 ("The decision between competing scientific formulations by reference to
crucial data obtained by investigation is easier than the resolution of philosophical issues by
rational debate."); id. at 65 ("The core of common experience to which the empirical
philosopher appeals is the same for all; and common or ordinary experience involves no
specialized techniques.").
281. See e.g., ETIENNE GILSON, GOD AND PHILOSOPHY 6-9, 112(2002) (tracing the origins
of philosophical thought on God or some other supernatural creator from ancient Greek to
modem times).
282. See supra note 110 (describing philosophical arguments that have been made over the
ages about the world's apparent design based on observations of natural objects and processes).
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is definitive.283 For instance, although cosmologists have postulated the "Big
Bang" theory to describe the origin of the currently observable universe, many
aspects of that theory have yet to be confirmed and, even then, it does not
answer some major questions about that subject-such as exactly how that
phenomenon occurred, or what state of affairs, if any, preceded it.2 4 And even
if science could satisfactorily explain how the origin of the universe and life on
Earth occurred through the operation of natural processes, that still would not
answer the questions of where such processes came from and why they existed
in the first place. 85 Thus, no matter how complete science is on these subjects,
there will always be major philosophical questions that remain to be examined
about them.286
As to the origin of species in general and humans in particular, as
discussed above, evolutionary science paints a more complete picture (although
far from a fully filled-in canvas). 287  Yet many important philosophical
questions remain to be answered, not the least of which are the ultimate
"where" and "why" questions just noted as applied to the existence of
evolutionary mechanisms such as natural selection. And when arguments are
made to refute natural selection as the causal agent for the diversity of species
on Earth, such as those of Dembski and Behe, to the extent these arguments do
not amount to scientific theories because they are not based on empirically
testable, objective data, what they really amount to is philosophical
argumentation about the implausibility of that process as an accurate
explanation of such diversity. 288 That is because these arguments appeal
283. See, e.g., PIGLIUCCI, supra note 241, at 146 (justifying the use of philosophy as a
means of logically explaining phenomenon that are not explainable by scientific means).
284. Id. at 242-43, 242 n.6.
285. Cf Stephen Hawking, Lucasian Professor of Mathematics, Cambridge University,
Origins of the Universe, J. Robert Oppenheimer Lecture in Physics at the University California,
Berkeley (Mar. 16, 2007) (transcript available at http://berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/
2007/03/16_hawkingtext.shtml) (presenting an argument, based on Einstein's theories of
relativity, that the universe was spontaneously created from nothing) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Hawking believes that modem astrophysicists and
cosmologists are on the way to understanding the mechanics behind the origins of the universe,
but he does not posit an answer to the metaphysical questions of whether a supernatural force
initiated these first physical processes that created the earth. Id.
286. See CoLLINS, supra note 20, at 66-70 (asserting the view that many scientific
developments and theories, such as the Big Bang theory and current understandings of the
formation of our solar system, "cr[y] out for a divine explanation").
287. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text (discussing acceptance of neo-
Darwinian synthesis).
288. See PIGLIUCCI, supra note 241, at 54 (comparing advocates of scientific creationism to
ID proponents and observing that "[a]t least ID theorists give philosophers (if not scientists) a
good run for their money"); see also John Wise, Intelligent Design Is Not Science: Why This
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primarily to our experiences and intuitions about the probability of given events
occurring, and logical inferences or deductions that may be drawn from our
conclusions.
The same holds true for argumentation, based on an acceptance of natural
selection as the main basis for the origin and diversity of species, when it goes
beyond scientific claims about that process. As noted earlier, scientifically-
trained commentators like Richard Dawkins frequently make arguments to the
effect that when science successfully explains the causation of physical
phenomena via the operation of natural processes, this proves the non-existence
of any supernatural beings or causation.289 This is a purely philosophical
argument, based solely on Dawkins's own reasoning and conclusions-drawn
from his training and experience-about the likelihood of supernatural forces
creating or directing the natural processes that science has proven to exist.290 It
is certainly not a scientific argument, since no empirical data supports
Dawkins' inferences against any supernatural involvement, and, in any event,
such a claim exceeds the scope of science's purview.
Given that these origins debates are mainly philosophical in nature, what,
then, would a basic philosophy course on this subject, geared towards upper
level high school students, look like? Presumably, it would teach and explore
the major arguments that have been made both for and against the existence of
a supernatural creator, and its continuing involvement, if any, in our world. As
noted earlier, one prominent version of that debate has taken place in recent
books by Dawkins and geneticist Francis Collins, the former director of the
Human Genome Project.29'
Matters, THE DAILY CAMPUS, May 4, 2007, at 11, available at
http://media.www.smudailycampus.com/media/storage/paper949/news/2007/05/04/Opinion/In
telligent.Design.Is.Not.Science.Why.This.Matters-2894591.shtml (arguing that intelligent
design is based on philosophical rather than scientific arguments, and criticizing both Dawkins
and Collins for making philosophical arguments rather than scientific ones).
289. See supra note 17, 149-50 and accompanying text (introducing Dawkins's work and
his scientific arguments that natural explanations for phenomena rule out the possible existence
of a supernatural creator).
290. See, e.g., Massimo Pigliucci, Is Dawkins Deluded? When Scientists Talk about
Religion, SKEPTICAL INQUIRER, July/Aug. 2007, at 20-21 (agreeing with Dawkins's ultimate
conclusion regarding atheism being the most reasonable answer but nonetheless asserting that
"when [Dawkins] says... that the God hypothesis... 'is a scientific question,' he is wrong.
It's a philosophical one.").
291. While not specifically addressed to each other, Collins's The Language of God and
Dawkins's The God Delusion represent notable articulations of opposing points of view on the
question of God's existence. See generally COLLINS, supra note 20 (discussing Collins's book
and contrasting his approach with that of Dawkins). However, Collins and Dawkins did engage
in a direct debate on this topic that was sponsored and chronicled by Time magazine. See David
Van Biema, God vs. Science, TIME, Nov. 13, 2006, at 48 (engaging the two scholars directly on
66 WASH. & LEE L. REV 587 (2009)
In The God Delusion, Dawkins mainly argues that while the existence of a
supernatural creator cannot be affirmatively disproven, it can be shown that it is
extremely improbable that such a being exists.292 Interestingly, he seems to
agree with ID proponents that the key question is how to explain a natural
world that appears to be exquisitely designed in its substance and
complexity. 293 But for Dawkins, the mechanism of natural selection provides
the complete answer, demonstrating that complexity can arise without
conscious design.294 Moreover, if complexity accretes from simpler life forms,
as natural selection has it, then how could a creator, who needs to be even more
complex than the complex world it designed, exist? In other words, explaining
apparent design by reference to an intelligent creator "immediately raises the
larger problem of who designed the designer."'2 9' Thus, he concludes, such an
explanation is untenable, and it is highly probable that such a creator does not
exist.296 As such, his argument appears to be the flip side of Dembski's, who
argues that apparent design in life makes it highly improbable that an
intelligent creator does not exist.
297
In The Language of God, Collins presents his arguments for why he
believes the existence of a divine creator is more probable than not.298 While
Dawkins focuses primarily on the "who created the creator" problem to argue
against the existence of such a being,299 Collins's arguments in favor of a
the issue of evolution versus intelligent design). Many different versions of this debate exist.
Another notable one, for example, is provided by comparing the writings of C.S. Lewis and
Sigmund Freud on this subject, two twentieth-century intellectual giants who were on opposite
sides of the debate. See NICHOLI JR., supra note 21, at 37 (presenting Lewis and Freud's
differing philosophies on the existence of a divine creator).
292. See DAWKINS, supra note 17, at 113 (noting that "[t]he argument from improbability,
properly deployed, comes close to proving that God does not exist").
293. Id. at 79, 113-34.
294. See id. at 79, 114, 141 (characterizing natural selection as the logical solution to the
improbability of intelligent design or the alternative that life began as a matter of pure chance).
295. Id. at 158.
296. Id.
297. See DEMBSKI & WELLS, supra note 126 and accompanying text (arguing that such
organization in living systems is evidence of a purposeful design rather than of chance
occurrence).
298. See generally COLLINS, supra note 20.
299. Interestingly, Dawkins also makes a positive argument for atheism in his discussion of
the anthropic principle (the idea that conditions on earth and in the universe are precisely tuned
to allow for the existence of life). DAWKINS, supra note 17, at 134-51. He argues that the
mystery of why life exists is answered by two alternatives: God or the anthropic principle. Id.
at 136. Dawkins concludes that we exist because we happen to be on a planet and in a universe
that can sustain life, not because God willed us to exist. Id. at 141. Beyond providing these
arguments in order to assert the improbability of God's existence, Dawkins also attempts to
650
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creator are more numerous and diverse. He first points to the presence of a
"Moral Law" that he sees as "a universal feature of human existence," wherein
"the concept of right and wrong appears to be universal among all members of
the human species (though its application may result in wildly different
outcomes). 30 0 Moreover, another universal aspect of the human experience
Collins discerns is a "uniquely human hunger ... [or] longing for the
sacred.30 1 The commonality of the foregoing human experiences, in his view,
point towards a supernatural creator attempting to communicate with its created
beings.30 2
Other signs that point to an intelligent creator for Collins include the
"simple and beautiful [mathematical] ... equations that describe the reality of
the natural world, 30 3 the way in which the Big Bang theory of the origins of the
universe "cries out for a divine explanation, ' 3°4 and the way in which, had
physical constants of numerous natural forces varied even slightly, human life
could never have arisen (i.e., how the universe appears to have been fine tuned
to give rise to, and support, human life).305 Collins also has a response to
Dawkins's conundrum. He notes that, especially in light of the Big Bang, "I
cannot see how nature could have created itself. Only a supernatural force that
is outside of space and time could have done that. 30 6 In other words, to make
judgments about the existence of a complex creator using the yardstick of how
complexity arose in the natural world is misplaced. Such a creator would
necessarily be operating from outside its creation, and would not be subject to
refute a number of traditional arguments for God's existence. See id. at 75-109 (providing brief
summaries of various non-scientific arguments for the existence of God, some serious and some
humorous, and dismissing them all). Perhaps it is in this chapter that Dawkins's work is most
obviously philosophical and non-scientific, since some of the arguments that he engages are
quintessentially philosophical arguments. Id.
300. COLLINS, supra note 20, at 22-23. Collins bases this line of reasoning on C.S.
Lewis's arguments for the existence of God set out in his classic work, Mere Christianity. C.S.
LEWIS, MERE CRIUSTIANITY (Scribner 1952) (1943). Lewis argues that a universal moral law is
known to each human person. Id. at 3-7. This law is as universal as the laws of nature, and yet
our knowledge of it is not dependent on how our observation of nature works. Id. at 13-16.
The universality and uniformity of the moral law, according to Lewis, is an argument for a
supernatural lawgiver. Id. at 17-20, 22-25.
301. COLLINS, supra note 20, at 29-30.
302. Id. at 38.
303. Id. at 62.
304. Id. at 67.
305. Whereas Dawkins sees this "anthropic principle" as a sign that life is a product of
chance, Collins sees the fine-tuned universe we live in as evidence of a divine creator. COLLINS,
supra note 20, at 78.
306. COLLINS, supra note 20, at 67.
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the same natural laws of evolution that it put in place. In short, one cannot
make judgments about a supernatural plane of reality based solely on
observations about how the natural world works.
30 7
Besides the arguments that Dawkins and Collins make, our philosophy of
origins course might also cover other major arguments that have been made
through time both for and against the existence of a supernatural creator. On
the "for" side, such arguments include those of a cosmological nature that were
made long ago by St. Thomas Aquinas in his influential Summa Theologica
and other works: For instance, to oversimplify somewhat, that nothing can
cause its own existence and, thus, an uncaused cause must exist; 3°8 that
unintelligent processes in nature seem to act towards a purposeful end, and thus
must be ultimately directed by an intelligent designer;30 9 and that time must
have a beginning, a first moment that gives rise to all other moments.
310
Another includes St. Augustine's argument that our mind's ability to perceive
eternal and objective truths, such as mathematics or logic, demonstrates the
existence of a supernatural realm because that which is eternal is not of the
natural world.31'
There is also the time-honored argument from purported miracles-that
there is scientific and historical evidence of phenomena where the physical laws
of nature appear to have been violated or suspended, and no explanation other
than supernatural causation seems possible.312 And, of course, arguments
drawn from the ID movement about the improbability of apparent design in
307. See also LEWIS, supra note 300, at 19 ("If there is a controlling power outside the
universe, it could not show itself to us as one of the facts inside the universe-no more than the
architect of a house could actually be a wall or staircase or fireplace in that house.").
308. PETER KREEFT, A SUMMA OF THE SUMMA: THE ESSENTIAL PHILOSOPIfCAL PASSAGES OF
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS' SUMMA Ti{EOLOGICA EDITED AND EXPLAINED FOR BEGINNERS 60-70
(1990). Aquinas's argument in this regard appears to anticipate and support Collins's argument,
see supra note 304 and accompanying text, for a supernatural creator based on the Big Bang,
and to anticipate and refute Dawkins's argument, see supra notes 295-97 and accompanying
text, as to who designed the Designer.
309. KREEFT, supra note 308, at 69. The modem ID movement is perhaps a variation on
Aquinas's argument here, though far from identical to it. Aquinas made the philosophical
observation that things without intelligence operate according to laws to achieve certain ends,
what we might call "laws of nature." Id. He argued that things which lack intelligence do not
move toward an end without being directed by intelligence. Id. This line of reasoning differs
from ID arguments in that it does not claim to scientifically detect design inherent in complex
organisms and structures, and could even be used to support a version of theistic evolution that
incorporated the theory of natural selection.
310. Id. at61 n.19.
311. Id.
312. See generally C.S. LEWIS, MIRACLES (Macmillan 1960) (arguing that God
supernaturally intervenes in the universe through miracles).
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nature arising by chance or undirected processes could be analyzed and
discussed provided they did not contradict pertinent scientific evidence.3 13 The
same could even be said for major origins theories based on purported
revelations in sacred texts, so long as they were examined critically using the
same standards of logical and experiential analysis as any other theory
(including that they were not in conflict with existing scientific evidence).
Thus, for instance, the more allegorical interpretations of the Genesis creation
that are consistent with an Earth that is billions of years old might be
considered.314
On the other side of the coin, besides Dawkins's argument, other major
ones against the existence of a supernatural creator that might be considered
include, first and foremost, the problem of evil in the world.3 15 How can evil
exist in a world created by a supernatural being that is allegedly both
omnipotent and omnibenevolent? Other major arguments that might be
discussed include certain variations on Dawkins's main argument discussed
above (to wit, that increased understandings of evolution made a divine creator
unnecessary, and in any event such an explanation is too complex and
improbable considering the paucity of empirical evidence of such a being),316 a
supernatural creator would not have created nature so imperfectly,317 the ideas
of a creator and religion are nothing other than an invention of our own
projected desires (a phenomenon that evolutionary biology and neuroscience
increasingly claim to support),318 the variety of religious sects that claim to
teach reality and truth notwithstanding the existence of many points of conflict
313. As noted earlier, philosophy is informed by scientific and other empirical evidence in
addition to relying on logic and experience. Supra notes 276-82 and accompanying text. Thus,
origins theories or arguments that contradicted existing scientific evidence would be
inappropriate to teach even from a philosophical perspective.
314. See, e.g., PIGLIUCCI, supra note 241, at 36-40 (describing different creationist
positions, each with varying degrees of acceptance of evolutionary theory).
315. See, e.g., B.C. Johnson, God and the Problem of Evil, in PHILOSOPHY AND
CONTEMPORARY IssuEs 137, 137-42 (John R. Burr & Milton Goldinger eds., 2004) (arguing
that an omnipotent, good God could not allow evil to exist).
316. See, e.g., Richard Dawkins, The Improbability of God, in PHILOSOPHY AND
CONTEMPORARY IssuEs, supra note 315, at 112, 112-17 (making such additional arguments).
317. See, e.g., John Hick, The Problem ofEvil, in PHILosOPHY AND CoNTEMPORARY ISSUES,
supra note 315, at 143, 143-47 (examining arguments for and against God's existence in light
of evil, pain, and suffering).
318. See Steven Pinker, Whence Religious Belief?, in SCIENCE AND RELIGION 311,311-14
(Paul Kurtz ed., 2003) (questioning the rationality of religious beliefs while describing
humanity's resort to religion as a tool for success).
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in such teachings, 319 and certain logical arguments that seek to refute a creator's
existence.320
All of the foregoing arguments constitute affirmative arguments for and
against, respectively, the existence of a supernatural creator. Of course, each of
these arguments would presumably have refutations by experts opposed to
them, which would need to be taught and considered contemporaneously in
order for a proper assessment to be performed. 321  But it is important to
emphasize that all of these arguments are primarily philosophical in nature;
they are informed by science and the empirical world, but they are grounded in
arguments drawn from logic and common human experience. None of these
arguments would be appropriately taught in a science class because they are
either not based in empirical analysis, or, to the extent they have an empirical
component, they present questions that science has yet to answer. However, as
noted above, whenever there was scientific evidence that refuted an argument,
it would not be appropriate to continue teaching it as a philosophical matter. It
would simply defy logic and human experience to propose as a candidate for
truth an explanation or argument that rests on empirical facts that science has
demonstrated to be false.
This brings us to the question of whether, were a public high school
inclined to offer an age-appropriate philosophy of origins course to address the
ongoing "religion as science" contests and the general lack of comprehensive
educational content designed to assist students with their worldview formation,
there exist any legal limitations on its ability to do so. At first blush, the main
issue here appears to be whether such a course could be taught consistently
with the Establishment Clause because it would center on the soundness and
persuasiveness of philosophical arguments both for and against the existence of
a supernatural creator, and might at times focus on religious doctrine or
teachings as a source for a particular origins theory. However, as I will seek to
demonstrate in Part IV, as long as such theories and arguments were taught and
319. See, e.g., Kai Nielsen, Does GodExist? Reflections on Disbelief, in PHILOSOPHY AND
CONTEMPORARY IssuEs, supra note 315, at 126, 311 ("Why then opt for any particular one
[religion]? Why claim or believe that a certain religion is the Truth and the Way? And if there
is no decent answer to these questions, why go in for any religious faith at all?").
320. See William E. Mann, Paradoxes of Omnipotence, in THE CAMBRIDGEDICTIONARYOF
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 54, at 643 (describing logical paradoxes that arise from the existence of
an omnipotent being). Among such logical arguments is the so-called "paradox of the stone":
"Can God create a stone too heavy for God to move? If God can, then there is something God
cannot do-move a stone-and if God cannot, then there is something God cannot do-create
such a stone." Id. at 644.
321. See, e.g., supra note 299 (discussing Dawkins's critiques of major arguments for a
supernatural creator).
654
GETTING BEYOND RELIGION AS SCIENCE
discussed as matters of philosophical inquiry and not as religious views or
beliefs, such a course would comport with that clause. I will also offer
suggestions on measures a school might adopt to provide assurance that such a
course would not stray across constitutional lines.
IV. Teaching a Philosophy of Origins Course in Public High Schools
A. Could Such a Course Be Taught Consistent with the
Establishment Clause?
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits the
government from making any "law respecting the establishment of
religion .... As noted earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court has generally
interpreted this provision to prohibit laws or other government actions that have
the purpose or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.323 In other
words, government neutrality towards religious beliefs, views, and practices-
neither favoring them nor discriminating against them-is the touchstone of
that clause's demands.324 Thus, as applied in the "teaching of origins" context,
when Arkansas barred the teaching of evolution in its public schools, 325 or
when Louisiana required that equal time be devoted to creation science
whenever evolution was taught,326 the Court determined that those States
322. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
323. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (articulating what is
commonly referred to as the Lemon test: "[T]he statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion...
finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion"'(quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970))). Despite frequent
criticisms and inconsistent application of the Lemon test by members of the Court, it has never
been overruled and appears to remain the dominant Establishment Clause standard at this time.
See, e.g., McCreary County, Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844,859 (2005)
(applying the Lemon test to the display of the Ten Commandments on the grounds of county
courthouses). If the entanglement prong of Lemon's test retains any vitality, however, it is
principally in the area of religious financial aid cases. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203,232 (1997) (treating the entanglement prong as part of the primary effects test in a religious
funding case).
324. See McCreary County, Ky., 545 U.S. at 860 ("The touchstone for our analysis is the
principle that the First Amendment mandates government neutrality between religion and
religion, and between religion and non religion.") (quotation omitted). Justices Scalia and
Thomas, however, are leading a movement to allow government to recognize, and in some ways
favor, the general theistic beliefs of the West. Id. at 885-900 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting).
325. Supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
326. Supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
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violated the principle that the government shall not purposefully attempt to
advance religious doctrines.
By its terms, the proscriptions of the Establishment Clause concern the
government's involvement in religion; the founding generation believing that
religious freedom was best promoted by keeping the government from
attempting to adopt one religious sect as the nation's official religion and
church, and, conversely, from disadvantaging other religious sects (primarily
Christian sects at the time of the founding).327 It is clear that the clause was
mainly concerned with the government's relationship to organized religious
groups, and their beliefs and practices, with the ultimate objective being to
maximize the religious freedom of Americans.
32
8
What, then, do the language and purposes of the Establishment Clause
have to say about the government conducting a high school class in the
philosophy of origins? Would such a class have as its purpose to advance or
inhibit religion? And, if not, would it nonetheless have a primary effect of
doing so? The closest the Court has come to providing an answer to these
questions lies in its oft-repeated assertion that public school educators can teach
about religion as long as the subject is "'presented objectively as part of a
secular program of education .... In other words, while teaching religious
beliefs or doctrines as truth would amount to an attempt to unconstitutionally
establish religion, it would not be such an establishment for educators to teach
about, say, the literary or historic qualities of a religious text such as the Bible,
or to teach a course in comparative religion or the history of religion. 330 There
is a critical constitutional difference, then, between objectively analyzing
religious subjects in public schools to assist students in understanding them and
attempting to proselytize or indoctrinate students in a given religious belief.
Accordingly, as to thepurpose test of the Court's establishment analysis,
what these assertions suggest is that the government will not be held to have an
327. See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 25, at 39 (noting that the Establishment Clause
originally had a dual purpose to prevent the new federal government from establishing a
particular religion or church and to prevent that government from interfering with churches that
were then established in various states).
328. At least, that is, maximizing the religious freedom of citizens visa vis the new federal
government. See supra note 327.
329. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679-80 (1984) (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington
Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963)).
330. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225 ("[I]t might well be said that one's education is not
complete without a study of comparative religion or the history of religion and its relationship to
the advancement of civilization. It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its
literary and historic qualities."). The Court adds: "Nothing we have said here indicates that
such study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of
religion, may not be effected consistently with the First Amendment." Id.
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unconstitutional purpose of advancing religion merely because it attempts to
teach students about it. And this is so despite the fact that one could plausibly
argue that by teaching students about religion, the government knows it will
likely be advancing it to some degree since there will inevitably be some cases
when a student adheres to (or has her faith strengthened in) a given religion as a
result of learning (or learning more) about it.331 But as long as there is no
evidence that the government's purpose is to achieve such incidental effects of
teaching about religion, and its sole purpose is to assist students in better
understanding religious subjects or issues, it is not acting in an unconstitutional
manner.
As to the primary effects test of the establishment analysis, the foregoing
assertions by the Court suggest that such a standard may be ill-suited to
assessing the constitutionality of teachings involving religious subjects. This
follows from the possibility, for instance, that in given cases students who learn
more about a particular religion might be led to become adherents of it, and
school officials or employees might never know this had happened. In such
cases, how would one assess whether the teachings had a primary effect of
advancing religion? Even putting aside the problem of learning about the
effects of such teaching, how would one measure whether the teachings
primarily made students more knowledgeable about religion or, alternatively,
primarily advanced the religion by gaining converts to it? By counting the
number of students who simply learned about the religion, as opposed to those
that both learned about it and converted to it? These problems demonstrate that
a straightforward application of a primary effects analysis to the issue of
teaching about religion is somewhat incoherent and impracticable, and probably
would not be an establishment test the Court would apply to this issue.
However, in more recent years, the Court has developed two other criteria
it sometimes employs beyond the standard Lemon analysis for measuring
whether a law or government act has a primary effect of advancing religion.
The first is to ask whether the law or act in question creates an appearance to
the "reasonably informed observer" (i.e., a person familiar with the background
context and purpose of a law or act) that the government is endorsing
religion-as this might be another way religion might be "advanced" by the
state.332 The second is to inquire whether the law or act has the effect of
331. Conversely, the opposite might happen as well. In situations when a student's faith
beliefs are undermined by such teaching the government would likewise not be
unconstitutionally inhibiting religion.
332. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000).
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coercing someone into participating in religious practices by creating a
situation in which there is peer pressure to do so, or by some other means.3 33
What do these more recent standards for measuring primary effects say
about teaching religion? Assuming the Court adheres to its earlier
pronouncements regarding the constitutionality of teaching about religion, and
there is no reason to believe it would not, what this has to mean is that such
teachings by public educators would not be deemed to place the government's
endorsement on religion, and nor would such a class be deemed to improperly
coerce students into believing religion or engaging in religious practices. And
this would make sense. As to endorsing religion, no reasonable observer of a
school class about religion who was informed regarding the government's
typical purpose for offering it-to, say, promote understanding of different
religions or their role in the history of human affairs-would view the
government as endorsing the religious beliefs and practices being taught so
long as those subjects were "'presented objectively as part of a secular program
of education .... ,, This is the basic difference between trying to promote
the understanding of various ideas, opinions, or teachings, and trying to
persuade a person as to their truth or validity. With respect to the coercion
standard, most school classes are somewhat coercive in the sense of forcing
students to think about, and often participate in discussions about, a given
subject in an attempt to foster an understanding of it. The same holds true for a
class teaching about religion. But, again, taught properly, it is difficult to see
how such a class would coerce students into believing the religion was true or
to engage in religious practices.335
In sum, under the relevant Establishment Clause tests used by the Court,
in the context of teaching courses about religion, it is clear that public schools
only act unconstitutionally when they have the purpose of advancing or
inhibiting religion as a matter of truth, or otherwise appear to be endorsing
religion as truth or coercing students into actually believing or practicing it.
How, then, would these principles apply to a basic philosophy of origins course
offered by public high schools? Would such a course be more like one that
seeks to teach about religious subjects or like one that teaches certain religious
views as truth?
In its consideration of different views on creative versus non-creative
action in the universe, a philosophy of origins course would be analogous to a
more general philosophy of religion course that typically focuses on examining
333. Id. at 310-13.
334. Supra note 329 and accompanying text.
335. See infra Part IV.C for a discussion of the proper way to teach such a class.
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the rationality of claims related to the existence or non-existence of a divine
being and other religious issues, 336 although an origins course would have a
narrower focus on positions about how the universe, the earth, life, and the
human species came into existence. Thus, such an origins course would
essentially combine a consideration of certain issues from the philosophy of
religion, of which an origins course could be considered a subset, with certain
issues from the philosophy of science (such as what Darwinian evolution
implies about the presence or lack of supernatural action in creating the human
race).
337
Discussions about religious questions in either a philosophy of religion or
origins class would differ markedly from, say, a "Sunday school" class that
sought to teach the beliefs and tenets of a particular religion, or even a class on
the theology of a particular religion or religious sect. This is because a class
teaching religious beliefs obviously assumes the truth of what it teaches (and is
generally taught that way), as does a more theological exploration of issues. A
course in Christian theology, for instance, would generally assume the truth of
the fundamental tenets of Christianity, and seek to explore, defend, and
synthesize them in relation to other fields of knowledge.338 In stark contrast,
philosophy of religion investigates, in an objective, critical, and systematic
manner, the rationality of such claims to truth using the tools of logic,
experience, and evidence. 339 The same can be said for a philosophy of origins
course examining religiously-based claims about how things began, applying
the same rationality analysis to them as it would to claims grounded in science.
In short, religious and theological courses teach religious beliefs and their
relationship to other subjects, while a philosophy of religion or origins course
336. See, e.g., Michael Martin, Three Courses in Philosophy of Religion, APA NEWSL.
(American Philosophical Association, Newark, DE) Fall 1997, available at http://www.apa.
udel.edu/apa/archive/newsletters/v97nl/teaching/three.asp (suggesting approaches to teaching
philosophy of religion) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
337. See, e.g., Lawrence Skiar, Philosophy of Science, in THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 54, at 700 ("[T]he branch of philosophy that is centered on a critical
examination of the sciences: [T]heir methods and their results .... Typical questions explored
might be metaphysical presuppositions of space-time theories.., the structure of explanations
in evolutionary biology, and the like.").
338. See, e.g., DANIEL L. MIGLIORE, FAITH SEEKING UNDERSTANDING: AN INTRODUCTION
TO CHmSTIAN THEOLOGY 1-7 (2nd ed. 2004) (describing theology as faith seeking
understanding).
339. See Philip L. Quinn, Philosophy of Religion, in THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 54, at 696 ("Modem philosophers of religion have, for the most part,
confined their attention to topics treatable without presupposing the truth of any particular
tradition's claims about revelation and have left the exploration of mysteries of faith to the
theologians of various traditions.").
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teaches critical and rational thinking about those beliefs themselves and, in
particular, the assumptions, arguments, and reasons underlying them.340
In this sense, then, a philosophy of religion or origins course would be
much more akin to teaching about religion or religious beliefs than teaching
that promoted or endorsed those beliefs themselves. Such courses subject
religious beliefs, including those concerning the existence and actions of a
supernatural creator, to critical, logical analysis rather than teaching their truth
or validity as matters of faith and revelation.
But, one might object, what about circumstances in which a teacher's
lecture, or the tenor of a class discussion, appeared to support the view that
logic, experience, and evidence made a stronger case for supernatural creative
action than origination via undirected natural forces? Unlike a comparative
religion course or one on the history of religion, the objection might continue,
which aim chiefly to describe or explain the beliefs and practices of various
religions or the role of religion in world history, a philosophy of origins course
would not only describe or explain different views or positions on origins
questions, it would critically evaluate them in terms of assessing their
rationality and soundness, would it not? Would such a course then amount to
teaching religious beliefs as true?
The short answer to this last question is "no." It is one thing to evaluate
the rationality of arguments or reasons for believing something about the nature
of reality, opining on the extent to which they appear to be compelled by, and
consistent with, logic, experience, and evidence. It is quite another to take the
additional step of making an assertion based on the analysis that the belief must
be true or false-at least, that is, where the belief is not subject to empirical
verification as in most matters relating to questions of ultimate origins. The
latter step is purely one of personal judgment and conviction. As long as a
teacher did not take this additional step, leaving such a determination to the
individual judgment of each student, the school would not cross the line
separating teaching about religious matters and teaching religious beliefs as
true. And, of course, the same principles would hold for the obverse situation
in which a lecture or discussion appeared to support the view that a critical
analysis of origins perspectives made a stronger case for a materialistic account
than a supernatural one.34'
340. It should be noted that by contrast, a comparative history of religion class is primarily
descriptive in nature, although the latter might engage in critical analysis of the strength of
competing claims about the influence of religion in history or other matters.
341. This is not to say, however, that a school should not implement additional
prophylactic measures to help ensure that the teaching of such a course remained within
constitutional bounds, such as prohibiting a teacher from offering her own views on the
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Admittedly, there is a large hole or grey area that exists between the
Court's assertions regarding teaching about religion and teaching religious
beliefs as true. On the one end of the spectrum are objective descriptions or
explanations about religion, at the other end are more subjective assertions
about what is true, but in the center lies an area of critical analysis about
religious claims to truth: Represented linearly, it is the difference between
About-Analysis-Assertion. Although I have argued that the first two
categories of teaching fall within constitutional parameters, a school might
reasonably take the prophylactic measure in a philosophy of origins course of
structuring the class to remain in the first zone of merely describing or
explaining different arguments or perspectives on origins (without any critical
analysis of their strengths or weaknesses). Such a measure would be
prophylactic in the sense of staying far away from having a teacher suggest, as a
result of critical analysis, that the rationality or soundness of an argument
regarding origins meant that the ultimate belief supported by it was, in fact, a
true description of reality (i.e., avoiding Analysis in order to prevent crossing
the line into Assertion). But such a "sanitized" course would hardly be
philosophical in a true sense of that discipline, and students would be deprived
of much of the course's value in terms of developing their depth of
understanding and own worldview formation. In Part IV.C, I will recommend
certain measures that a school could take to help ensure that a course involving
critical analysis could be safely offered while minimizing constitutional
concerns.
Moreover, to the extent there is any Establishment Clause ambiguity
regarding the constitutionality of teaching about arguments supporting ultimate
religious beliefs (including the belief that no supernatural being exists or was
involved in various origins events) or the critical analysis thereof, another
provision of the First Amendment-the Free Speech Clause-would counsel
resolving it in favor of the permissibility of such teachings and discussions. It
is to that discussion that I now turn.
B. The Free Speech Clause as a Mediator of Establishment Clause
Ambiguity in the Public School Classroom
When it comes to free speech rights of students in public primary or
secondary schools, the Court has famously said that students do not "shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
apparent philosophical soundness of various arguments or perspectives that are discussed.
Indeed, in Part IV.C, infra, I recommend that such a measure be taken.
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gate. '3 42 At the same time, however, the Court has never suggested that school
educators do not have the right to control student speech in the classroom.
School officials have the right to determine curriculum content, and a teacher
has the right to lecture and control classroom discussion as appropriate to
properly teach such content.343 However, the right of students to speak in the
classroom is not the issue in the present context. Here, the question is,
assuming a school district desired to offer a basic philosophy of origins course
in its high schools to address the "religion as science" conundrum and
otherwise prepare students for this ongoing public debate, would the Free
Speech Clause play a role in addressing any Establishment Clause ambiguities
associated with doing so?
To answer this question, we must first identify the relevant speech rights at
stake. They would not likely be those of the school district itself, since the
Court has been unclear and ambivalent on whether government units even
enjoy First Amendment protections against other units of government (such as,
in this case, a lower court that might attempt to enjoin an origins course
pursuant to its reading of the Establishment Clause).344 They would also not
likely be the rights of the teacher himself or herself. The Court has not
addressed the existence or scope of a public school teacher's free speech rights
in the classroom, but many lower courts have, and generally hold that such
rights are very limited (at least when they conflict, as in the typical situation,
with the curricular desires of the school district).345 But when the school
district and teacher's desires are aligned, such as in a situation when the district
desired to offer an origins course and a teacher was willing to teach it, the
teacher would likely be treated as the district's agent-and subject to the same
questionable rights as the district itself.
However, the Court has been clear that free speech rights generally
include a right to receive ideas and information that a speaker desires to
342. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,506 (1969) (holding that
a prohibition on wearing armbands to high school was an unconstitutional denial of the
students' right of free expression).
343. See, e.g., Borger by Borger v. Bisciglia, 888 F. Supp. 97, 99 (E.D. Wis. 1995)
("Students do not lose their First Amendment rights when they walk through the schoolhouse
door.... However, courts have decided that the scope of the First Amendment within the
classroom must be tempered, and that the content of the curriculum is within the sound
discretion of school officials, with exceptions in rare cases.").
344. See, e.g., U.S. v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194,210-11 (2003) (plurality opinion)
(declining to decide whether government entities enjoy First Amendment rights).
345. See, e.g., Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 522-23 (9th Cir.
1994).
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communicate. 34 6 In Board of Education v. Pico,347 a three-justice plurality of
the Court applied this right in the public school context, holding that the school
board's removal of certain books from the school library could violate the
students' right to receive information if such actions were motivated by
improper reasons. 348  While four dissenting justices disagreed with the
extension of that right to public school students,349 this was in the context of a
dispute between the school officials and certain students (together with their
parents) over what books were appropriate for a public school library. In a
situation when, as with our postulated origins course, the interests of school
officials and students were aligned because the former wished to offer such a
course and the latter desired to take it, a larger number ofjustices than the Pico
plurality would likely be inclined to view it as implicating strong free speech
interests of the students.
The question then would be, assuming some students and parents sued to
enjoin a public high school from teaching an origins course on Establishment
Clause grounds, how the Court might go about reconciling these competing
constitutional guarantees. That body has not decided many cases involving
clashes between free speech rights and the Establishment Clause, but in the
ones it has decided the Court evinced a tendency to resolve such disputes in
favor of speech rights.35° Virtually all of these cases have involved situations
where a governmental body, mostly public schools or universities, allowed part
of its property or funds to be used for various expressive activities but explicitly
excluded religious expression because of concerns about violating the
Establishment Clause. 351 In all five of these cases, the Court held that the
346. See, e.g., Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of
Information: Towards A Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 Onio
ST. L.J. 249,250 (2004) (citing Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) and Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)).
347. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
348. See id. at 871 ("If petitioners intended by their removal decision to deny respondents
access to ideas with which petitioners disagreed, and if this intent was the decisive factor in
petitioners' decision, then petitioners have exercised their discretion in violation of the
Constitution.") (internal citations omitted). Two other Justices concurred with the plurality's
result on different grounds. See id. at 878 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) ("[T]he principle involved here is both narrower and more basic than the 'right to
receive information' identified by the plurality."); id. at 884 (White, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("We should not decide constitutional questions until it is necessary to do so, or at
least until there is better reason to address them than are [sic] evident here. I therefore concur in
the judgment of affirmance.").
349. See id. at 885-93 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that students do not enjoy a right
to access specific books in a school library).
350. See infra note 351 (discussing Supreme Court precedent addressing this issue).
351. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98,120 (2001) (finding that a
66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 587 (2009)
exclusions violated the religious speakers' free speech rights, essentially on the
theory that religious expression was entitled to equal constitutional treatment as
secular expression absent a clear and convincing case that allowing the former
would result in an Establishment Clause violation.352 And in none of these
cases did the Court find such a violation even though they involved such
religiously-infused situations as a large cross displayed on the lawn of a state
capitol building, 353 Bible lessons being taught in a public school,354 and
government funds being used to produce a religiously-oriented student
newspaper. 355 It seemed clear that the Court was resolving Establishment
Clause ambiguities in favor of free speech rights in order to vindicate the "all
speech is equal" principle, including speech of a religious nature.
356
One could argue, on the strength of these precedents, that any
Establishment Clause ambiguities regarding the teaching of an origins course,
both in terms of describing the competing arguments and critically analyzing
them, should be resolved in favor of the free speech rights of the students-and
especially because such a course would not involve religious expression per se
but rather expression about a subject that included religious and non-religious
beliefs, and the reasons supporting them. However, a counterargument could
be made that these precedents are different than the origins proposal because
they involved the government attempting to distance itself from religious
activities of third parties as opposed to itself teaching subjects touching on
school violated the Constitution in denying a Christian club the use of school facilities);
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845 (1995) (finding a
constitutional violation when a university denied funding for printing a student newspaper with
a Christian editorial perspective); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384, 395 (1993) (finding a constitutional violation where a public school denied a church
request to use school facilities solely because of the religious nature of the program); Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (finding a constitutional violation when religious groups
were excluded from using university facilities); see also Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd.
v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995) (addressing the use of state capitol grounds for expressive
purposes).
352. See generally cases cited supra note 351. But cf Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725
(2004) (holding that state did not violate the Free Exercise Clause by refusing to fund
devotional theology instruction due to concerns about violating a state constitution's
establishment clause).
353. Capitol, 515 U.S. at 770.
354. GoodNews Club, 533 U.S. at 120.
355. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845.
356. This equality principle serves as the main basis for the Court's general prohibition
against content discrimination in free speech law. See Barry P. McDonald, If Obscenity Were to
Discriminate, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 475,482 (2009); Barry P. McDonald, Speech and Distrust:
Rethinking the Content Approach to Protecting the Freedom of Expression, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1347, 1357 (2006) (discussing origin of content discrimination principle).
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religious beliefs. But this does not change the fact that in those cases the Court
essentially forced the government to engage with religious speakers on an equal
basis with other speakers, and "blessed" those arrangements from an
Establishment Clause perspective.
Analogously, with respect to offering an origins course, the government
would simply be engaging in expression about religious beliefs and
perspectives on an equal basis with scientific and other perspectives on the
subject, all within a secular program of education designed to teach students a
broad array of topics deemed important to a student's education.357 For these
reasons, it seems that the free speech rights of students desiring to receive such
ideas and information would trump any competing Establishment Clause
concerns about offering such a course, at least in the grey areas discussed above
when the Court has not spoken to the constitutionality of teaching one of this
nature.
Of course, as with even a basic descriptive course on, for instance,
comparative religions, a basic philosophy of origins course would need to be
structured and taught properly in order to keep it within permissible
constitutional limits-in terms of the linear conception described above, within
About and Analysis rather than Assertion. Just how a school district could go
about accomplishing this goal is the subject of the next and last section of this
Article.
C. Keeping a Philosophy of Origins Course Within Permissible
Constitutional Bounds
Having argued and concluded that it would be constitutional for a public
high school to offer a course explaining, discussing, and analyzing competing
perspectives on life and human origins provided it was properly structured and
taught, the next question becomes how school officials might go about doing
this. The primary object here would be to structure and teach such a course in a
manner that allowed for a healthy discussion and exchange of views with
respect to different origins perspectives, while maintaining balance, objectivity,
and neutrality in their presentation and exploration-and certainly to keep such
a class from entering the forbidden territory of teaching that a religious or non-
religious view of origins was true. This subject can be usefully examined by
looking at four main areas of course planning and implementation that would
need to take such considerations into account: the general structuring of the
357. See supra notes 329-30 and accompanying text (outlining the permissibility of
teaching about religion within a secular education).
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course and its promotion to students, the educational materials that would be
used in class, the preparation of teachers to conduct such a course, and how it
was actually taught in the classroom.
In regards to fitting a basic philosophy of origins course within a high
school curriculum, given its mature subject matter, it would probably be
appropriate to only allow junior and senior level students to enroll in it.358 Not
only might younger students have difficulty understanding the arguments and
perspectives presented, even in versions that have been simplified somewhat
for presentation at an upper-class high school level (as they would need to be),
but, just as importantly, younger students might not appreciate the stated
mission of such a course-to make an objective presentation of views on both
sides of the creator versus non-creator divide and not to endorse or promote one
view over another. In this regard, younger students taught to believe one view
or another might feel that such a course was threatening their beliefs, as
opposed to helping them understand a wide range of views people hold on the
subject and to assist them in the ongoing development of their own worldviews.
Moreover, at least until some experience with such a course had been
gained, it would probably be appropriate to make it an optional element of the
curriculum.359 Even at the junior and senior student level, there would likely be
those students and their parents who objected to such a course on religious
grounds, as happens with more descriptive courses such as ones on comparative
religion. Making such a course an elective requirement would obviate concerns
by schools that students and their parents might claim it substantially burdened
students' rights to the free exercise of religion as guaranteed by the
Establishment's Clause First Amendment counterpart, the Free Exercise
Clause. 360 And if experience with an origins course counseled that it should
become a required part of the curriculum, then schools could adopt a policy of
allowing objecting students to be excused from attendance provided they
appeared to have legitimate concerns about the free exercise of their religion.36'
358. Cf, e.g., NORD, supra note 4, at 348 (discussing teaching about religion in public
schools and observing that "the complexity of religion and the potential for controversy require
that students in Bible and religion classes possess a good deal of maturity. Such courses should
be taught only in high schools.").
359. Cf, e.g., ACLU et. al., Joint Statement of Current Law on Religion in the Public
Schools (1995) http://www.aclu.org/religion/schools/16146leg19950412.html (last visited Mar.
23, 2009) (focusing on the need to allow student choice in matters of religious conscience) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
360. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
361. Cf, e.g., ACLU et al., supra note 359 (noting the desirability of student opt-out
provisions).
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In terms of how the nature of an origins course is communicated to
students, a school would want to be careful in the course description to
emphasize its secular educational purpose of promoting an understanding of
competing views on the subject in order to prepare students for the ongoing
public debate on this fundamental issue, assisting students in making thoughtful
decisions regarding their own worldviews, and promoting tolerance of differing
views held by other members of society.362 In addition, the course description
should be clear that the goal of the class is limited to teaching students about
varying perspectives and discussing perceived strengths and weaknesses from a
philosophical standpoint (i.e., in light of reason, human experience and
empirical evidence), and not to suggest to students or persuade them that any
one view or set of views should be preferred over another.
With respect to course materials, again the goal here would be to have as
balanced and neutral a presentation of origins perspectives as practicable. In
order to secure this goal, it would be best to establish in advance a relatively
fixed set of topics and reading assignments for the course to diminish the risk
of individual teachers who might, consciously or unconsciously, "weight" the
course materials in favor of one position or another. Ideally this would take the
form of a textbook that was developed by experts with training in philosophy
(and particularly the philosophy of origins, or of the philosophy of science or
religion in general), who were sensitized to the Establishment Clause issues at
stake, and who could present the various arguments and concepts at the level of
upper-level high school students. However, since this level of professionalism
in preparing materials might not be achievable by school districts until there
was a substantial market for such a text, in the beginning they might
alternatively recruit the foregoing type of experts to assist them in developing
an approved syllabus and reading list that teachers were obligated to follow in
teaching an origins course.
Such course materials might begin by discussing the nature of science and
religion, and how philosophical analysis can be used to discuss and consider
views and beliefs on a subject like origins from the perspective of both
traditions.3 63 With respect to science, students should be led in particular to
understand the nature and limits of the scientific endeavor (and especially its
commitment to methodological naturalism) and what it takes for knowledge or
theories to be considered "scientific. 364 As to religion, students should, at a
362. Cf., e.g., CHARLES C. HAYNES ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN SCHOOLS 37-38
(2003) (discussing issues to consider in structuring religious activities in public schools).
363. See supra Part III.C (discussing philosophic methods to evaluate both scientific and
religious assertions).
364. See supra notes 180-207 and accompanying text (discussing the nature and limits of
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minimum, understand its different approach to understanding the world,
generally starting with a set of accepted beliefs based on revelation and other
sources of religious knowledge. 365  And, finally, students might be led to
understand how the discipline of philosophy can generally take propositions
from both traditions and subject them to critical analysis based on tools of
understanding utilized to a more or less degree by each of them: reason and
logic, empirical evidence, and human experience (with science drawing more
heavily on the former two tools and religion on the latter one).366
Beyond these introductory subjects, the materials would presumably
consist of differing perspectives on the origin of the universe, life on Earth, and
the human race, drawn from the dominant materialist and theistic schools of
Western thought discussed earlier.367 Again, the various arguments and
counterarguments would have to be excerpted or described at a level suitable
for understanding by upper-class high school students. Moreover, if a school
thought that origins perspectives from other traditions, such as deism or
pantheism, were desirable in order to be more inclusive or comprehensive in its
coverage, there is no reason it could not include such perspectives so long as its
selection process was governed by legitimate pedagogical criteria as opposed to
religious or ideological considerations.368
Another major issue school officials would have to face in offering an
origins course would be teacher training. Presumably most public high schools
do not have on staff many teachers trained in philosophy, or even religion for
that matter. But at its most basic level, and one likely suitable for teaching high
school students, philosophy draws on common tools for understanding the
world (reason, experience, evidence) and applies them in an organized and
systematic manner to substantive questions. 369 Teachers in particular are
familiar with such ways of thinking, since they generally engage in similarly
the scientific endeavor).
365. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (describing religion as a personal or
institutional set of beliefs in a supernatural being and reality).
366. See supra notes 276-82 and accompanying text (noting philosophy necessarily
combines both approaches in the way it applies logic to the common human experience).
367. See supra notes 291-320 and accompanying text (discussing major theistic and
materialist arguments regarding the existence or nonexistence of a divine creator).
368. Cf., e.g., Jay D. Wexler, Preparing for the Clothed Public Square: Teaching About
Religion, Civic Education, and the Constitution, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1159, 1237-42
(2002) (discussing considerations for selecting which religions to teach about in a religious
studies course).
369. See supra notes 276-82 and accompanying text (describing how philosophy can
combine elements of both theology and science to address issues important to the common
human experience).
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structured thought when they plan and teach their classes. At its crudest level,
philosophy essentially takes a proposition and asks "Does it make sense?"
Accordingly, many teachers would likely have the raw skills necessary to
explain differing origin perspectives and examine them in a critical, rational
way, but what about the scientific or religious substance underlying them?
Certainly high schools have teachers trained in science, and often social
studies or history teachers will have had some amount of education about
various religions. And, of course, many teachers will have had some amount of
education in their own religion of choice. The point is that high schools would
not be starting from scratch in terms of formal training in various aspects of
these subjects, and certainly many of the teachers will have thought about key
origins issues as part of developing and adopting their own worldviews. Given
this background, it is likely that many teachers could be prepared to teach an
origins course with an achievable and realistic amount of training.
One common way school officials might go about making sure teachers
were prepared to teach an origins course from both a methodological and
substantive point of view would be to create a certification requirement for it.
370
The certification could be achieved in a number of ways: through having
certain majors or minors in college that exposed teachers to formal training in
science, philosophy, and religion; through the creation of a college course on
the philosophy of origins that teachers would need to successfully pass;371 or,
by bringing in qualified experts to conduct workshops that teachers would need
to take in order to pass some form of proficiency exam.372 The certification
process should also have a requirement that a teacher of the course receive an
adequate level of training in Establishment Clause law so that teachers were
aware of the ground rules that they needed to observe when teaching an origins
course.
373
370. Cf generally SUSAN L. DOUGLASS, TEACHING ABOUT RELIGION IN NATIONAL AND
STATE SOCIAL STUDIES STANDARDS 102-03 (2000), available at http://www.freedomforum.org/
publications/first/teachingaboutreligion/teachingaboutreligionexecutivesummary.pdf (arguing
that pre-service and in-service training for teachers of courses involving religious content are
essential in order to ensure that they teach neutrally).
371. Cf id. (describing a flexible approach that could involve undergraduate courses but
also include in-service training on the job).
372. Cf DOUGLASS, supra note 370, at 103 (observing that "[n]ecessary elements of in-
service training include peer collaboration based on sharing areas of expertise, workshops in
which teachers are exposed to content knowledge by specialists in the field, exposure to
available resources and workshops on integrating skills and content in teaching about
religions").
373. Cf, e.g., HAYNES ET AL., supra note 362, at 52 (describing the difference between
teaching religion and teaching about religion).
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One of the key ground rules should be that although a teacher would be
expected to explain views and arguments presented in the approved reading
materials and to lead students in discussing their perceived strengths and
weaknesses based on reason, experience, and evidence, she should avoid
reaching conclusions or offering her opinion on their apparent soundness from
a rationality perspective. Although it is not clear that the Establishment Clause
would legally require this-because advocating the sounder rationality of a
particular argument in the context of a philosophical discussion is, as discussed
earlier, different than advocating a particular religion as true based on a belief
derived from faith or revelation (an issue that arises more in the context of
teaching about religion)374 -- schools would likely want to adopt this rule as a
prophylactic measure to guard against teachers, wittingly or not, transforming a
philosophical discussion into one that, explicitly or implicitly, advocated the
truth of a particular religious belief. In short, it would be best for teachers to
remain neutral on the ultimate philosophical soundness of a particular view in
order to avoid any appearances or realities of advocating it as truth as a result of
its perceived rationality.
But what, one might ask, is a teacher to do if a student asks her about her
opinion on the ultimate soundness of differing arguments and perspectives, or
even about her religious (or non-religious) beliefs themselves and what led her
to hold them? In such a case, the advice given by a noted guide to teaching
about religion in the public schools is on point: The teacher may respond either
that she prefers not to answer the question because it would be inappropriate to
inject her own personal views into the discussion (explaining the necessity for
maintaining an objective and balanced approach both for pedagogical and legal
reasons), or, because upper class high school students would be mature and
intelligent enough to distinguish personal opinions from official positions of the
school, "the teacher may at most answer with a brief statement of personal
belief-but may not turn the question into an opportunity to proselytize for or
against religion. 3 75 Another good suggestion the guide makes to avoid
injecting a teacher's personal views into a course, which would also be
appropriate to a philosophical setting, would be to require him or her to teach
the subject by attribution (e.g., "Theists might argue that" or "Materialists or
atheists might claim that").
376
374. See supra notes 338-40 and accompanying text (distinguishing a theology course
from a philosophy of religion course).
375. CHARLES C. HAYNES, A TEACHER'S GUIDE TO RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 7
(1999), available at http://www.freedomforum.org/publications/first/teachersguide/teachers
guide.pdf.
376. Cf. id. at 3-4 ("Classroom discussions concerning religion must be conducted in an
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Lastly, school officials would probably want to replicate a practice used in
the area of teaching about religion to deal with potential constitutional
problems in the philosophy of origins context as well. This practice is to
establish a policy whereby student or parental complaints or concerns about a
teacher abusing such a class to advocate her own religious beliefs or worldview
could be confidentially reported and immediately investigated and resolved. If
such abuse was found, the policy could provide for immediate substitution or
removal of the teacher involved.377
By planning and implementing a philosophy of origins course in
accordance with the suggestions outlined in this section, it is this author's belief
that a public high school teacher could lead students in a robust and meaningful
discussion of different perspectives on these important questions, all in
accordance with applicable constitutional requirements.
V Conclusion
This Article has examined, and proposed a solution for resolving, two
enduring and important problems in American public education. The first is
the ongoing legal contests that occur, and will continue occurring in the
absence of an acceptable alternative, regarding the teaching of evolutionary and
other scientific theories in public schools that are perceived to conflict with
religious perspectives on life. The second problem is intimately related to the
first: The general tendency, through mistaken perceptions about the law or
otherwise, for American public education to ignore the teaching of religious
perspectives on life and thereby to relegate them to second class status in our
society. This latter problem really comes home to roost when parents of
students and others perceive that an imperfectly implemented but well-
intentioned secular education agenda may be inadvertently pushing students
towards accounts of our existence that may be antithetical to their fundamental
beliefs and worldviews.
The solution proposed by this Article is to address these problems head on
through the creation and implementation of a course, geared to upper-level high
school students, that teaches and examines philosophically different accounts of
environment that is free of advocacy on the part of the teacher .... When discussing religion,
many teachers guard against injecting personal religious beliefs by teaching through
attribution.").
377. See CHARLES C. HAYNES & OLIVER THOMAS, FINDING COMMON GROUND: A GUIDE TO
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 219 (2001) (describing a "Religious Practices Complaint
Procedure" established by the Richardson Independent School District of Richardson, Texas
that would be desirable to address any complaints of constitutional violation).
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our existence and where we came from-drawn from both scientific and
religious perspectives. Not only would such a course assist students with
adopting informed and considered worldviews of their own, but it would
ideally operate to relieve some of the pressure to conform science educational
content to particular religious views of life. Moreover, it would also prepare
our youths to understand and participate in the ongoing public debate on these
fundamental issues and increase their tolerance and respect for the perspectives
of others. In a pluralist democratic society where citizens must work and live
together despite dramatic differences in their basic attitudes on life, any
exercise that makes people realize that reasonable people can differ in good
faith on such matters, and that we are all ultimately connected by our own
searches for ultimate truth and meaning, can only be a positive thing.
